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From Horseback to the Moon and Back: 
Comparative Limits on Police Searches of 
Smartphones Upon Arrest 
BRYCE CLAYTON NEWELL† AND BERT-JAAP KOOPS† 
The search of a smartphone by the police in connection with an arrest carries the potential to 
intrude into the very core of an arrestee’s private life. Indeed, such a search has been compared 
to providing a “window[] to our inner private lives,” including aspects of our lives completely 
disconnected from the reasons for the arrest. In recent years, the supreme courts of the United 
States, Canada, and the Netherlands (as well as Dutch legislators) have handed down rules about 
how, and whether, police may search an arrestee’s smartphone upon arrest without first 
obtaining a warrant or other court order. These responses can be categorized as either container-
based or content-based approaches, depending on whether the court (or legislature) focuses on 
protecting the privacy-sensitive content (for example, personal information) as such or, rather, 
the container (for example, the smartphone) as a proxy for protecting privacy-sensitive content 
contained within the device. After analyzing and comparing the approaches adopted in each of 
these three countries, we argue that both approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and 
we suggest a combination of the two as a fruitful path forward, balancing the important privacy 
and law enforcement interests at stake. 
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The [government] asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is 
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical items 
[such as cigarette packs, wallets, or address books]. That is like saying a ride 
on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both 
are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping 
them together. 
— Chief Justice John Roberts, United States Supreme Court1 
INTRODUCTION 
If a traditional police search of an arrestee’s pockets, purse, or wallet for 
investigatory purposes can be characterized as a simple “ride on horseback,” 
then, comparatively, a similar search of an arrestee’s smartphone is “a flight to 
the moon.”2 The two searches, although both relevant to law enforcement 
investigations, are fundamentally distinguishable from each other in character—
as noted by Chief Justice John Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, “[b]oth are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies 
lumping them together.”3 The distinction, according to the Court in its 
unanimous 2014 decision in Riley v. California,4 is compelled by the underlying 
interest in personal privacy that limits unreasonable police searches of private 
persons and their property. While “inspecting the contents of an arrestee’s 
pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest 
itself,” the search of the person’s cellphone constitutes a qualitatively and 
quantitatively different (and much greater) intrusion into personal privacy.5 And, 
the Supreme Court’s holding is not limited to the most modern smartphones. 
Indeed, the ruling extends to both smartphones and not-so-smart phones, as the 
Court found that even a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller range of features than 
a smart phone . . . [is] based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few 
decades ago.”6 As put by one Canadian court, “[s]earches of these devices 
engender privacy concerns that have no analogue.”7 Additionally, questions 
about the proper scope of searches conducted incident to arrest are important, in 
part, because, “[t]he power to search incident to arrest not only permits searches 
 
 1. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (citation omitted). 
 2. Id. In Riley, the search of two different types of cellphones were at issue: a “smart phone”—defined by 
the court as “a cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large 
storage capacity, and Internet connectivity”—and a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller range of features than a 
smart phone.” Id. at 379–80. Although the Court focused much of its reasoning on the advanced capabilities of 
modern smartphones, the holding covered both. In the Court’s words, “[b]oth phones are based on technology 
nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago.” Id. at 385. As such, although we focus in this Article on modern 
smartphones, we also discuss where doctrine might make distinctions between different mobile phones based on 
their (broad or limited) capabilities. 
 3. Id. at 393. 
 4. Id. at 373. 
 5. Id. at 375. 
 6. Id. at 379–80, 385. 
 7. R. v. Nero (2016), 345 O.A.C. 282, para. 157 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
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without a warrant, but does so in circumstances in which the grounds to obtain 
a warrant do not exist.”8 
Only a few months after the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) 
decided Riley, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was confronted with a 
similar question: whether “the general common law framework for searches 
incident to arrest needs to be modified in the case of cell phone searches incident 
to arrest.”9 Additionally, in the Netherlands, courts have also grappled with this 
question in recent years—and while lower courts had been split on the issue, the 
Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) finally addressed the issue in 2017.10  
In each of these lines of cases, courts have had to weigh law enforcement 
interests against suspects’ interests in privacy and to determine whether existing 
legal frameworks for regulating searches incident to arrest should be modified 
to account for the fact that these searches can constitute a “much more 
significant invasion of privacy”11 than the sorts of searches envisioned by those 
who promulgated these frameworks. Similar challenges apply to the ability of 
law enforcement to search other types of computing devices, including, for 
example, digital cameras,12 laptop computers, or computers embedded in 
automobiles.13 
Indeed, the power to search the vast amount of information that modern 
smartphones might contain would allow the police to overcome prior limitations 
(or “physical realities”) that existed in the pre-smartphone environment.14 In 
effect, this is a situation where  
[c]ourts and legislators have had to deal with questions about how the law 
relating to atoms applies to cases involving bits (in the absence of bits-specific 
law), facing the fact that bits and atoms have different properties and finding 
that the law is not adequately suited to cope with relevant differences.15 
And, as demonstrated by the fact that courts and legislators in multiple 
countries have been grappling with this issue for years, these cases pose 
 
 8. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 16 (Can.). 
 9. Id. at para. 58. 
 10. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NR:HR:2017:584 (Neth.).  
 11. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 58. 
 12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mauricio, 80 N.E.3d 318, 324 (Mass. 2017) (holding, on state 
constitutional grounds, that “the search of data contained in digital cameras falls outside the scope of the search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement”). 
 13. See, e.g., Mobley v. State, 816 S.E.2d 769, 770–71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that the defendant did 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data collected from the “airbag control module” in his car after 
a high-speed crash). 
 14. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014) (“One of the most notable distinguishing features of 
modern cell phones is their immense storage capacity. Before cell phones, a search of a person was limited by 
physical realities and tended as a general matter to constitute only a narrow intrusion on privacy.”). 
 15. Ronald Leenes, Of Horses and Other Animals of Cyberspace, 1 TECH. & REGUL. 1, 1 (2019), 
https://techreg.org/index.php/techreg/article/view/3/techreg.2019.001. A stark example of a court simply 
denying that, in the context of arrest-related searches, digital realities differ from physical realities is a South 
African case, State v. Miller. 2015 (4) All SA (WCC) at 27 para. 51 (S. Afr.) (“In any event, given the importance 
of speedy investigatory steps in the fight against crime it seems counter-productive to require the police to follow 
a bureaucratic procedure to access digital information, a procedure which would not be required in respect of 
non-digital evidential material.”).  
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important questions for continuing or extending our historical approach to 
criminal procedure—questions that extend beyond the law and experience of 
any single nation.  
This is particularly true since the law has often protected underlying 
privacy interests by protecting concrete proxies (for example, objects or 
containers, such as houses, bags, or digital devices that enclose or surround 
aspects of a person’s private life)16 rather than the underlying (and sometimes 
abstract) privacy interests themselves. This is largely a pragmatic solution, as it 
provides police officers (and other government agents) with relatively concrete 
and identifiable rules to work with, rather than forcing them to make complex, 
ex ante determinations about when a search is allowed based on abstract notions 
of privacy. However, protecting privacy by proxy can also limit flexibility down 
the line as new technologies or investigatory measures develop that bypass 
historically identified proxies, and that facilitate the privacy intrusions the earlier 
proxies were designed to prohibit.  
In this Article, our first aim is to analyze how legislators and judges in three 
countries (the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands) are responding to the 
increasingly common scenario where police seek to obtain information from 
people’s smartphones incident to an arrest—an investigatory method that 
challenges traditional legal frameworks within procedural criminal law, 
especially since the privacy-intrusiveness of smartphone searches extends well 
beyond what lawmakers anticipated when drafting existing criminal procedure 
law (including various search-incident-to-arrest exceptions across jurisdictions). 
Importantly, we exclude consent-based searches from our analysis, examining 
only those cases where searches are conducted without the consent of the 
suspect.17 
Our second aim is to outline various conceptual and normative anchor 
points that may help legislators and others deal with this issue. In earlier 
research, we identified new boundary-marking concepts arising in various 
jurisdictions to protect privacy in the context of criminal procedure.18 This paper 
allows us to analyze whether and to what extent these new concepts may help in 
regulating police smartphone searches. Specifically, we examine whether and 
how a combination of emerging and pre-existing container-based and content-
based approaches to regulating police searches might be used to solve the 
challenge of finding a framework that is both sufficiently concrete (to be 
manageable for police officers) and sufficiently technology-neutral (to be 
sustainable in light of significant and ongoing socio-technical change). This 
 
 16. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & 
Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 540–44 (2017) (exemplifying objects used as 
proxies in privacy law). 
 17. Consent provides a basic exception to limits on investigatory police searches in all three jurisdictions 
examined in this study. 
 18. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Ivan Škorvánek, Location Tracking By Police: The 
Regulation of ‘Tireless and Absolute Surveillance’, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 635, 685 (2019); Ivan Škorvánek, 
Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Andrew Roberts, “My Computer Is My Castle”: New Privacy 
Frameworks to Regulate Police Hacking, 2019 BYU L. REV. 997, 1078 (2019). 
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analysis can help practitioners and courts further develop rules on smartphone 
searches, especially since the rules stipulated by the supreme courts we reference 
here remain rather general and raise questions in post-judgment practice. 
In this research, we engage in comparative, doctrinal legal analysis. We 
conducted doctrinal legal analysis research for three jurisdictions (United States, 
Canada, and the Netherlands) and compared our findings across jurisdictions. 
We chose these three jurisdictions based on their relevance to a larger 
comparative study of privacy and criminal law and procedure and the fact that, 
of the countries in that larger study, these three have each had a recent supreme 
court ruling addressing the question of when police may search a suspect’s 
smartphone during or shortly after an arrest.19 
Some limitations apply. Our analysis only covers searches conducted by 
the police following and connected (incidental) to a lawful arrest. We do not 
examine legal rules that govern police searches of smartphones (or cellphones) 
outside the search-incident-to-arrest context. We also do not examine the 
regulation of device searches at international borders or points of entry, where 
different legal rules often apply. Additionally, we assume for the purposes of 
our analysis that police are technically capable of looking inside a seized 
smartphone, for instance, because it is not password-protected, or it is seized 
when unlocked. Questions of compelled disclosure of passwords or biometric 
disclosure raise different types of questions and fall outside the scope of our 
analysis.20 
In Part I, we outline the basic contours of the law regarding police searches 
incident to arrest in the three chosen countries and then examine how the 
respective supreme courts have ruled in cases involving searches of cellphones 
incident to arrest. In Part II, we examine these developments from a more 
conceptual and theoretical perspective, analyzing how the reasoning in these 
recent court rulings fits into broader debates about protecting privacy in an era 
when the “privacies of life”21 are often held in (or are accessible through) a small 
device that fits inside a person’s pocket. We highlight how the U.S. approach to 
protecting privacy and limiting law enforcement investigations focuses on 
protecting proxies, like smartphones themselves, while Canadian and Dutch 
approaches focus more on the content to be searched or examined. The 
regulatory choice to either institute a blanket ban on investigatory conduct (like 
that imposed by Riley) or a more nuanced, case-by-case, and context-dependent 
inquiry (like those promulgated in Canada and the Netherlands) has a significant 
 
 19. See Koops et al., supra note 16, at 504–10 (noting information about the methodology we employed in 
the broader study); Koops et al., supra note 18, at 639–40; Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell, Andrew 
Roberts, Ivan Škorvánek & Maša Galič, The Reasonableness of Remaining Unobserved: A Comparative 
Analysis of Visual Surveillance and Voyeurism in Criminal Law, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1210, 1212–13 (2018). 
 20. For recent discussions of compelled decryption, see, for example, Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption 
and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 799 (2019); Laurent Sacharoff, Response, 
What Am I Really Saying When I Open My Smartphone? A Response to Orin S. Kerr, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 
63, 72 (2019).  
 21. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 
373, 403 (2014)).  
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impact on how privacy is protected. In conclusion, we argue that a balance 
between these container- and content-based approaches to regulating police 
searches of smartphones (and similar devices) might provide a better way 
forward, providing practical, usable guidance for police officers on the ground 
but not ignoring the fact that not all searches of digital devices are, or need to 
be, flights to the moon. 
I.  THE POWER TO SEARCH CELLPHONES INCIDENT TO ARREST  
In this Part, we outline the basic contours of the law regarding police 
searches incident to arrest in our three chosen countries, analyze recent high 
court decisions that examine how their respective search-incident-to-arrest 
doctrines apply in the context of cellphone searches, and finally examine how 
these decisions have been interpreted in subsequent case law. We focus in 
particular on how the privacy interest in these cases has been conceptualized and 
translated into legal limits on law enforcement searches of cellphones.  
A.  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
1.  Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine 
In the United States, police searches (generally, investigatory measures 
carried out to collect evidence) are regulated by the Fourth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.22 The Fourth Amendment prohibits state agents from 
conducting “unreasonable searches”—those that would intrude on a person’s 
interests in their property or their reasonable expectations of privacy—without 
first obtaining a judicial warrant.23 The Amendment explicitly covers “persons, 
houses, papers [including correspondence], and effects [property].”24 Over the 
years, SCOTUS has crafted a variety of exceptions to this general rule. Although 
it existed in practice prior to its formal recognition by the courts, SCOTUS first 
acknowledged the search-incident-to-arrest exception in 1914, in Weeks v. 
United States,25 even though it was not directly relevant in that case. In Weeks, 
the Court acknowledged, in dicta, “the right on the part of the Government, 
always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the 
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of 
crime.”26 According to the Court in Riley v. California, one hundred years later, 
Since that time, it has been well accepted that such a search constitutes an 
exception to the warrant requirement. Indeed, the label “exception” is 
something of a misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to 
arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted pursuant to a 
warrant.27 
 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). 
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In the one hundred years between Weeks and Riley, the scope of the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception garnered a “checkered history.”28 When the 
Court was confronted with questions about the applicability of the exception to 
smartphone searches in Riley, there were three primary cases that governed 
searches incident to arrest: Chimel v. California,29 United States v. Robinson,30 
and Arizona v. Gant.31 In Chimel (from 1969), the Court invalidated an 
exhaustive search of an arrestee’s entire house and noted that the purposes 
served by the exception were to protect officer safety and to preserve 
evidence.32 According to the Court, 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the 
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to 
use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety 
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is 
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any 
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the 
arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”—construing that 
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.33  
However, four years later in Robinson, the Court interpreted this test rather 
broadly, holding that an arresting officer may conduct a pat-down of the 
arrestee’s body and clothing and even go so far as to open containers found on 
the suspect’s person, even when the search moves beyond being a search for 
weapons or evidence related to the crime at hand.34 Ultimately, the Court held 
that searches incident to arrest are a legitimate response to “the need to disarm 
and to discover evidence”35 (to ensure officer safety, to preserve evidence, and 
to secure evidence related to the crime for which the suspect had been arrested). 
As long as the arrest itself was lawful, the Court held, 
a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact 
of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that 
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only 
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also 
a “reasonable” search under that Amendment.36 
Finally, in Gant, the Court applied the language of Chimel to limit the 
ability of police officers to search the passenger compartment of an automobile 
incident to an arrest, except in circumstances “when the arrestee is unsecured 
 
 28. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009)). 
 29. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). 
 30. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 31. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
 32. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. In this case, a “crumpled package of cigarettes” containing illicit drugs. Id. 
 35. Id. at 235. 
 36. Id.  
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and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the 
search.”37 
2.  Searching Cellphones Incident to Arrest Prior to Riley 
In Riley, SCOTUS consolidated two separate underlying cases: United 
States v. Wurie38 (a federal First Circuit case from Massachusetts) and People v. 
Riley39 (a California state case). In Wurie, a Boston Police Department detective 
observed Brima Wurie engage in what looked like a drug transaction.40 After 
arresting the buyer and confirming that Wurie had sold him crack cocaine, the 
police followed Wurie and arrested him near his home as he exited his vehicle.41 
The police seized two phones, but did not immediately search them incident to 
Wurie’s arrest.42 Rather, their limited search of one of the phones came later, 
while Wurie was waiting to be booked into jail.43 After noticing that one of the 
phones was receiving calls from a number marked as “my house,” the police 
accessed the phone, viewed the wallpaper on the screen, accessed the call log, 
and acquired the number that had been making the incoming calls.44 The trial 
court judge noted that although “[i]t seems indisputable that a person has a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her cell phone . . . the 
search of Wurie’s cell phone incident to his arrest was limited and reasonable.”45 
In so holding, the judge cited numerous district court decisions from around the 
country that had come to similar conclusions.46  
 
 37. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. In Gant, the Court also announced a new, automobile-specific exception, 
allowing officers to search a passenger compartment “when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 38. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 
(2014). 
 39. People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).  
 40. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 1. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109–10 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 46. For example, in United States v. Finley, the Fifth Circuit held that a cellphone was analogous to other 
types of closed containers that might be found on a person, such as a package of cigarettes or a footlocker. 477 
F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the exception applied to the search of “call records and text messages” 
on the arrestee’s phone); see also United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277 (D. Kan. 2007) 
(“Traditional search warrant exceptions apply to the search of cell phones.”); United States v. Deans, 549 F. 
Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008) (“[I]f a cell phone is lawfully seized, officers may also search any data 
electronically stored in the device.”); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CCR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3–4 (E.D. 
Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (searching the defendant’s phone contemporaneously with his arrest was reasonable); United 
States v. Dennis, No. 07-008, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007) (finding that the search of a 
cell phone incident to valid arrest was no different from the search of any other type of evidence seized incident 
to arrest). In other cases, judges analogized cellphones to pagers, an earlier technology that courts had already 
decided fit into the container analogy. See, e.g., Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 109; United States v. Reyes, 922 F. 
Supp. 818, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a warrantless search of the stored memory of two pagers was 
justified by the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 535 (N.D. Cal. 
1993) (finding that the warrantless search of pager memory was comparable to searching through the contents 
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However, not all lower courts were convinced that cellphones should be 
treated as ordinary containers. In United States v. Wall,47 for example, a judge 
in the Southern District of Florida rejected the cellphone-as-container analogy, 
stating that “searching through information stored on a cell phone [in the context 
of an inventory search] is analogous to a search of a sealed letter, which requires 
a warrant.”48 And in United States v. Park,49 a California court likewise 
distinguished cellphones from pagers (and other, more traditional, containers). 
“Any contrary holding,” the court stated, “could have far-ranging 
consequences,” because  
modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense amounts of 
private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones 
record incoming and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, 
calendars, voice and text messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can 
store highly personal information on their cell phones, and can record their 
most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email 
and text, voice and instant messages.50  
In Wurie, on appeal, the First Circuit reversed the trial judge’s holding that 
the search of Wurie’s phone was reasonable, finding that the search-incident-to-
arrest exception, as a general rule, does not authorize the warrantless search of 
data on a cellphone seized from an arrestee’s person during an arrest.51 The First 
Circuit noted that courts around the country  
have struggled to apply the Supreme Court’s search-incident-to-arrest 
jurisprudence to the search of data on a cell phone seized from the person. The 
searches at issue in the cases that have arisen thus far have involved everything 
from simply obtaining a cell phone’s number to looking through an arrestee’s 
call records, text messages, or photographs.52 
Although most courts to address the issue had upheld warrantless searches 
of cellphones incident to arrest, the First Circuit rejected this line of 
argumentation, noting that it “fails to account for the fact that the Supreme Court 
has determined that there are categories of searches undertaken following an 
arrest that are inherently unreasonable because they are never justified by one of 
 
of a container); United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that it was 
reasonable for law enforcement agents to activate the defendant’s pager to confirm its number). As other 
evidence that courts had latched onto the cellphone-as-container idea, some judges also authorized warrantless 
searches of cellphones pursuant to the automobile exception. In United States v. James, one district court judge 
held that “the automobile exception allows the search of the cell phone just as it allows a search of other closed 
containers found in vehicles.” No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 29, 2008). 
 47. United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008).  
 48. Id.  
 49. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 50. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 51. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 
373 (2014). 
 52. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). 
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the Chimel rationales: protecting arresting officers or preserving destructible 
evidence.”53  
Thus, the First Circuit held that, to be lawful, a search of a cellphone 
incident to arrest must fall within one of these limits imposed by Chimel (for 
example, protecting officers or preserving evidence).54 The court emphasized 
their finding that cellphones (as well as tablet or laptop computers) have the 
capacity to store much more information than something like a pager, purse, or 
cigarette package (more traditional “containers”), and that this  
information is, by and large, of a highly personal nature: photographs, videos, 
written and audio messages (text, email, and voicemail), contacts, calendar 
appointments, web search and browsing history, purchases, and financial and 
medical records. It is the kind of information one would previously have stored 
in one’s home and that would have been off-limits to officers performing a 
search incident to arrest.55 
This difference, the court noted, expanded the “nature and scope of the 
search itself,” and was not only limited to a distinction based on the nature of 
the object seized.56 Thus, at issue is the fact that, “[a]t the touch of a button a 
cell phone search becomes a house search, and that is not a search of a 
‘container’ in any normal sense of that word, though a house contains data.”57 
Although other courts had decided these questions on a case-by-case basis, the 
First Circuit went so far as to proclaim a general rule that cellphones could never 
be authorized by the search-incident-to-arrest exception; the court stated, “[w]e 
therefore hold that the search-incident-to-arrest exception does not authorize the 
warrantless search of data on a cell phone seized from an arrestee’s person, 
because the government has not convinced us that such a search is ever 
necessary to protect arresting officers or preserve destructible evidence.”58 
In the second case consolidated into Riley v. California at the Court, People 
v. Riley, the California Court of Appeals upheld a search of David Riley’s 
cellphone.59 In that case, Riley was arrested after he had become a suspect in a 
gang-related shooting of a passing vehicle.60 His phone was seized (along with 
two firearms), and an officer searched and noticed gang-related content on the 
phone.61 Later, another officer searched Riley’s phone at the police station, 
accessing videos, photographs, and other files during his search.62 In holding 
 
 53. Id. at 7. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).  
 56. Id. at 9. 
 57. Id. at 8–9 (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Flores-
Lopez court found that evidence preservation concerns in that case outweighed any invasion of privacy, 
upholding the warrantless search of the cell phone, because the search at issue was minimally invasive—only 
directed at discovering the phone’s number. 670 F.3d at 809–10. 
 58. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13. 
 59.  People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 60. Id. at *1. 
 61. Id. at *3. 
 62. Id. 
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that the warrantless search of Riley’s phone was justified, the California Court 
of Appeals relied on a prior California Supreme Court decision holding that even 
“a delayed search of an item immediately associated with the arrestee’s person 
may be justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest without consideration as 
to whether an exigency for the search exists.”63 The People v. Riley court did not 
offer any substantive discussion related to privacy, nor about equating 
cellphones with ordinary containers. Indeed, in People v. Diaz, the California 
Supreme Court had expressly disclaimed any ability to restrict searches of 
cellphones based on their information-rich nature under existing SCOTUS 
precedent.64 According to the court, “[t]he relevant high court decisions do not 
support the view that whether police must get a warrant before searching an item 
they have properly seized from an arrestee’s person incident to a lawful custodial 
arrest depends on the item’s character, including its capacity for storing personal 
information.”65 
In contrast to Wurie (and, eventually, the subsequent decision by 
SCOTUS), the California Supreme Court was not persuaded that the storage 
capacity of a cellphone should be determinative of the issue of whether a search 
was reasonable.66 According to the court, “[e]ven ‘small spatial container[s]’ 
that hold less information than cell phones may contain highly personal, intimate 
and private information, such as photographs, letters, or diaries.”67  
3.  Riley at the Supreme Court 
In January 2017, SCOTUS granted certiorari to both underlying cases, 
consolidating them into a single case for the purpose of determining whether the 
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement should extend to searches of cellphones.68 A unanimous Court ruled 
that they should not—and that searches of cellphones, even incident to arrest, 
should generally require a judicial warrant.69  
In his primary opinion, Chief Justice Roberts focused attention on the long-
standing principle that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
‘reasonableness’” and that, in the law enforcement investigative context, 
“reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.”70 Then, 
after outlining general search-incident-to-arrest doctrine (including Chimel and 
 
 63. Id. at *4 (citing People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506 (Cal. 2011)). 
 64. Diaz, 244 P.3d at 506. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 507. 
 67. Id. at 508 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). But see United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 
632–34 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that Riley was distinguishable because “[t]he storage capacity of the magnetic 
strip of a credit, debit or gift card pales in comparison to that of a computer hard drive, cell phone, or even 
audiocassette”). 
 68. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 378 (2014). The Court framed the question as: “whether the police 
may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been 
arrested.” Id.  
 69. Id. at 403. 
 70. Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added) (first quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); and 
then quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)).  
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Robinson, discussed above), Justice Roberts moved directly to addressing the 
intrusive nature of cellphone searches. In his words, modern “phones are based 
on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago, when Chimel and 
Robinson were decided.”71 Thus, the “categorical rule” set out in Robinson (that 
searches incident to arrest were reasonable as a consequence of the arrest 
itself)—while striking “the appropriate balance in the context of physical 
objects”—should not carry “much force with respect to digital content on cell 
phones.”72 Indeed, while “the two risks identified in Chimel—harm to officers 
and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial arrests,” the Court 
found that, “[t]here are no comparable risks when the search is of digital data.”73 
According to the Court, exemptions to the warrant requirement must be 
assessed by balancing “the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an 
individual’s privacy [with] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of 
legitimate governmental interests.”74 In the case of cellphone searches, the Court 
opined, 
  The United States asserts that a search of all data stored on a cell phone is 
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of these sorts of physical items. 
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a 
flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little 
else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, 
implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a 
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.75  
The Court subsequently elaborated the many traditional devices a 
cellphone might incorporate (“[t]hey could just as easily be called cameras, 
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers”) and focused, at length, on the storage 
capacity of the devices.76 Storage capacity was important to the Court, because 
it related directly to questions of privacy and the intrusiveness of an 
investigatory search.77 In sum, the Court’s concerns can be summarized as a 
direct reaction to “the likelihood that an electronic device will contain 1) many 
kinds of data, 2) in vast amounts, and 3) corresponding to a long swath of 
time.”78  
First, the Court drew on concerns related to the mosaic theory,79 finding 
that, “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an 
 
 71. Id. at 385. 
 72. Id. at 386. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 385. 
 75. Id. at 393. 
 76. See id. at 393–97. 
 77. Id.  
 78. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing the considerations the 
Court in Riley relied on in determining the need for a warrant to search a cellphone). 
 79. For more on the mosaic theory, see, for example, Koops et al., supra note 18, at 693–95; Bryce Clayton 
Newell, Privacy and Surveillance in the Streets: An Introduction, in SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY AND PUBLIC 
SPACE 1, 4–6 (Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan & Bert-Jaap Koops eds. 2019); Christopher Slobogin, Making 
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address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much more 
in combination than any isolated record.”80 Relatedly, the Court noted that a  
cell phone’s capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far 
more than previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be 
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, 
and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones 
tucked into a wallet.81  
Second, the Court found it persuasive that cellphones documented a 
person’s personal life and communication much more pervasively than older 
technologies, such as a diary, and that this meant it is more likely that law 
enforcement would be able to find evidence in any given investigation.82 As 
noted by the Court, “[a]llowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine 
basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in 
the occasional case.”83 
Additionally, the Court noted that, since cellphones often contained 
information that was stored elsewhere (for example, in the cloud), allowing 
police to search these records incident to arrest might allow the search to “extend 
well beyond papers and effects in the physical proximity of an arrestee,”84 an 
important limitation on the exception. And, in response to concerns raised in the 
underlying cases about cellphone searches essentially amounting to searches of 
an arrestee’s house, the Court stated, 
  In 1926, Learned Hand observed . . . that it is “a totally different thing to 
search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from 
ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him.” If his 
pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. Indeed, a cell 
phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most 
exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many 
sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array 
of private information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone 
is.85  
In dicta, the Court also rejected prosecutors’ proposals that police ought to 
be able to search cellphones incident to arrest solely for evidence related to the 
 
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2012); David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking 
Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
381, 402–11 (2013) (raising a number of criticisms of the impact of the mosaic theory on Fourth Amendment 
law); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 315 (2012) (asserting 
“as a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”). The Court has also raised similar concerns in 
other recent Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 
2216 (2018) (referring to information that was “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled”). 
 80. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 394–95. 
 83. Id. at 395. 
 84. Id. at 398. 
 85. Id. at 396–97 (citation omitted).  
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crime leading to the arrest or “where an officer reasonably believes that 
information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or officer safety will be 
discovered.”86 These proposed limitations, in the Court’s view, “would prove no 
practical limit at all” or, at least, “impose few meaningful constraints on 
officers.”87 The Court also rejected the proposal that officers should be able to 
“search cell phone data if they could have obtained the same information from 
a pre-digital counterpart,” refusing to force courts and officers from engaging 
on “a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which digital files are 
comparable to physical records” on a case-by-case basis.88 According to the 
Court, 
  Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With 
all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the 
privacies of life.” The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry 
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy 
of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question 
of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an 
arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.89 
4.  Post-Riley Case Law 
In the years since Riley was decided, hundreds of state and federal cases 
have cited the decision, many also involving cellphone searches. These cases 
have ranged from high school principals searching students’ phones for text 
messages,90 to searches of government employees’ cellphones by their 
supervisors,91 to officers viewing call logs or text messages or verifying a 
phone’s number,92 and officers searching parolees’ phones during an 
investigatory detention.93 Courts have held that certain populations have 
 
 86. Id. at 399. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 400–01. 
 89. Id. at 403 (citation omitted). 
 90. Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F. App’x 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing this case, because Riley 
“did not attempt to spell out how its holding could be transposed to the setting of a public school”). 
 91. United States v. Cochran, 682 F. App’x 828, 839 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that existing precedent did 
not give supervisor “fair warning” that search was unlawful). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Gary, 790 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jenkins, 850 F.3d 
912, 916 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lustig, 830 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lewis, 
615 F. App’x 332, 337–38 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that Riley applied to officer’s accessing text messages on an 
arrestee’s cell phone incident to arrest, but that the violation constituted “harmless error” due to the amount of 
additional evidence the police had acquired from other means); United States v. Govan, 641 F. App’x 434, 435 
(5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Blackman, 625 F. App’x 231, 234 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Monestime, 
677 F. App’x 76, 79 (3d Cir. 2017) (admission of evidence obtained pursuant to officer’s search “for recent calls 
and contacts,” conducted pre-Riley, was justified by the good faith and independent source exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule). 
 93. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1275 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that that a warrantless 
search of the defendant’s phone was not unconstitutional because parolees have a diminished expectation of 
privacy); United States v. Collier, 932 F.3d 1067, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that an offender under 
supervised release has a diminished expectation of privacy, even after Riley); United States v. Hathorn, 920 F.3d 
982, 975 (5th Cir. 2019) (finding that a special condition allowing probation officer to access probationer’s cell 
phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Jackson, 866 F.3d 982, 983 (8th Cir. 2017) 
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diminished privacy interests in their phones—for example, a parolee might lose 
the ability to contest a warrantless search on this basis,94 but probationers may 
not, as their interests are not as significantly reduced.95 Even in the border search 
context, where law enforcement usually has greater ability to search devices at 
international entry points, courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have used the reasoning 
in Riley to limit investigatory powers.96 The Ninth Circuit has also extended 
Riley’s holding that cellphones should not be analogized to traditional 
“containers” in the contexts of automobile or probation searches.97  
Additionally, courts have extended Riley’s reasoning to searches of other 
electronic devices, including laptop computers98 and digital cameras.99 For 
example, in Schlossberg v. Solesbee (decided pre-Riley, but relying on similar 
reasoning), one district court judge stated, 
it is impractical to distinguish between electronic devices—between a laptop 
and a traditional cell phone or a smart phone and a camera, before an officer 
decides whether to proceed with a search of the electronic device incident to 
arrest. A rule requiring officers to distinguish between electronic devices is 
impractical. It would require officers to learn and memorize the capabilities of 
constantly changing electronic devices. A primary goal in search and seizure 
law has been to provide law enforcement with clear standards to follow. In 
sum because an electronic device like a camera has a high expectation of 
privacy in its contents, an officer may not review the contents as a search 
incident to arrest.100 
Citing both Riley and Schlossberg, a federal judge in New York similarly 
held that searches of digital cameras were comparable to searches of 
smartphones, due to their “capacity to store a vast number[] of images.”101 
However, other courts have come to (arguably) alternate conclusions, for 
 
(holding that warrantless search of Jackson’s cell phone did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Jackson 
was serving a term of supervised release and living in a community correctional facility, and that, in these 
circumstances, Jackson had “no legitimate expectation of privacy in the cell phone”). 
 94. See, e.g., Johnson, 875 F.3d at 1275; Collier, 932 F.3d at 1073–74; Hathorn, 920 F.3d at 975; Jackson, 
866 F.3d at 983.  
 95. United States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 610–12 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit held that “while the 
privacy interest of a probationer has been ‘significantly diminished,’” the defendant still “had a privacy interest 
in his cell phone and the data it contained. That privacy interest was substantial in light of the broad amount of 
data contained in, or accessible through, his cell phone.” Id. 
 96. United States v. Cano, 934 F.3d 1002, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 97. Lara, 815 F.3d at 610–11 (first citing Riley, 573 U.S. at 397; and then citing United States v. Camou, 
773 F.3d 932, 942–43 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding that a cellphone should not be considered a “container” as part of 
a reasonable “search of an automobile” or “for purposes of a probation search”)). 
 98. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–91 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 99. See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012). Cf. Am. News & Info. Servs., 
Inc. v. Gore, No. 12-CV-2186 BEN KSC, 2014 WL 4681936, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (“The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California provides some guidance, but leaves the law with regard to cameras 
unsettled.”). 
 100. Schlossberg, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1170. 
 101. United States v. Whiteside, No. 13 CR 576 PAC, 2015 WL 3953477, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) 
(“Here, the digital camera provided officers with much of the same information about Whiteside as that obtained 
by the officers, and used against the defendant, in Riley.”). 
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example, in a case involving the search of an arrestee’s video cameras on 
multiple occasions, in which the judge concluded that the “cameras at issue here 
appear to fall somewhere between the physical search of a cigarette package 
found in a pocket during a search incident to arrest allowed under United States 
v. Robinson, and the data search of a cell phone under Riley that generally 
requires a warrant.”102 
Decisions such as this, which are in conflict with the reasoning in 
Schlossberg, demonstrate the existing ambiguity in how, or whether, lower 
courts will seek to differentiate between types of digital devices (for example, 
based on the specific storage capacity or technical capabilities of different 
devices). 
Several cases (both pre- and post-Riley) have held that the police calling a 
suspect’s phone (to verify the number associated with the seized phone and its 
connection to the suspect) or simply viewing information available on a phone’s 
lock screen did not constitute searches under the Fourth Amendment.103 These 
decisions have rested on a distinction between police officers: (1) interacting 
with the phone at an external level (for example, merely viewing a message on 
the lock screen or calling the phone’s number); and (2) affirmatively opening, 
manipulating, accessing, or retrieving “any information from within the 
phone.”104  
For example, in United States v. Brixen, an undercover detective posing as 
a fourteen-year-old girl in online conversations with the defendant sent the 
defendant a Snapchat message just after his arrest to “illustrate that the officers 
knew why he was there and that he had been interacting with an undercover 
detective.”105 The Seventh Circuit found that, once a suspect had been arrested, 
he lost his right to keep his phone in his pocket (out of sight of the officers), and 
that “just as an individual who fails to conceal a phone’s ring from those in 
earshot does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, an individual who 
allows notifications to appear to those in plain sight does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”106 
Importantly, the Seventh Circuit read “Riley and its progeny” as 
maintaining “a common thread—they involve law enforcement officers 
affirmatively accessing the content within cell phones to gather evidence against 
arrestees.”107 Thus, the court held that no Fourth Amendment search had 
 
 102. Am. News & Info. Servs., 2014 WL 4681936, at *10 (citation omitted).  
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 2018) (sending a Snapchat message to 
the arrestee’s phone and viewing a contemporaneous receipt notification on the lock screen did not constitute a 
search); United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2012) (calling a suspect’s number twice and 
hearing the suspect’s phone ring both times did not constitute a search). 
 104. Brixen, 908 F.3d at 281 (emphasis added) (“[The officer’s] actions simply do not amount to a search 
of Brixen’s cell phone. He did not open or otherwise manipulate Brixen’s phone. Nor did he gain access to any 
of the phone’s content or attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”); Lawing, 703 F.3d at 238 
(“The police did not attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”). 
 105. Brixen, 908 F.3d at 279. 
 106. Id. at 282. 
 107. Id. at 281 (emphasis added). 
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occurred because the detective merely “watched the phone . . . as a Snapchat 
notification appeared on the screen” and “did not access any content within 
Brixen’s phone, nor did he manipulate the phone in any way before he obtained 
a search warrant.”108 In sum, “since the phone’s content was not affirmatively 
accessed by law enforcement officers, no search occurred.”109 
In comparison to these cases, in which officers have sent signals to an 
arrestee’s phone, the Canadian cases discussed in Part I.B.4 generally address 
situations where officers view incriminating information—sent by a third 
party—on the lock screen of a phone. As in these Canadian cases, the plain-view 
exception is relevant in the United States. Indeed, although it did not conduct an 
explicit plain-view analysis, the Brixen court rested its holding on the fact that 
the investigating officer in that case “only witnessed what was in plain view.”110 
Under U.S. law, the “plain-view” doctrine holds that  
if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its 
incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a 
lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. If, 
however, the police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view 
is contraband without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if 
“its incriminating character [is not] ‘immediately apparent’”—the plain-view 
doctrine cannot justify its seizure.111 
Thus, if the police observe information—such as a text message—on the 
lock screen of an arrestee’s phone, for example, they would be justified in 
seizing the phone on the basis of the plain-view doctrine only if the 
“incriminating character” of the observed information “is immediately 
apparent.”112 A subsequent search of the device, however, would generally 
require a warrant. In such cases, according to the Supreme Court, “the seizure 
of an object in plain view does not involve an intrusion on privacy.”113 Some 
courts have interpreted this rule cautiously in the context of police searches of 
digital data, especially given the privacy-friendly language in cases like Riley.114  
Unsurprisingly, post-Riley search-incident-to-arrest cases cover a broad 
range of factual and legal contexts, as lower courts have had to apply the broad 
reasoning of Riley to a variety of factual scenarios. Across circuits, decisions 
have not always been consistent and new decisions are being published very 
frequently, making it impossible to make up-to-date, generalizable statements 
about the current state of the law. Notably, however, these lower courts have 
both expanded Riley’s privacy-related protections beyond smartphones (for 
 
 108. Id. at 279. 
 109. Id. at 282. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Horton, 496 U.S. at 141. 
 114. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that “the plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement must be applied cautiously in situations involving digital data.” People v. Davis, 438 P.3d 266, 271 
(Colo. 2019) (interpreting its prior holding in People v. Herrera, 357 P.3d 1227, 1233–34 (Colo. 2015)). 
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example, applying SCOTUS’s reasoning to cases involving laptop computers 
and digital cameras) and enumerated exceptions or limitations to Riley’s holding 
(for example, based on diminished expectations of privacy). Decisions limiting 
Riley’s applicability have focused on the legal status of the device owner (for 
example, a probationer), the visibility of the information on the phone’s lock 
screen (something akin to the plain-view exception), and the level of active 
manipulation of the phone by the police.  
B.  CANADA 
1.  Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine 
In Canada, police searches are largely regulated by Section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (although statutory law also provides 
the police power to search).115 The intent of Section 8 is to “protect individuals 
from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy.”116 In doing so, Section 8 
also protects “the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy.”117  
The Supreme Court of Canada has differentiated between three types of 
privacy protected by Section 8: personal, territorial, and informational. 
According to the Court, the Charter protects informational privacy by seeking 
“to protect a biographical core of personal information which individuals in a 
free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from 
dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to reveal 
intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.”118 
In determining whether any search is reasonable, the Supreme Court of 
Canada analyzes whether the contested “police activity invades a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”119 Examining the totality of the circumstances, this 
involves a two-step test for determining whether subjective expectations of 
privacy are objectively reasonable, fashioned after the test proposed by Justice 
Harlan of the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.120 All 
warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable.121 As in the United States, 
warrantless searches incident to arrest have become the “majority of searches 
actually conducted by the police” in Canada, even though intended to be an 
“exception rather than the rule.”122  
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 119. R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, 533 (Can.). 
 120. R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, para. 45 (Can.); see also R. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, para. 
19 (Can.). 
 121. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 81. 
 122. Id. at 97; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (“‘[E]xception’ is something of a 
misnomer in this context, as warrantless searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant.”). 
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Much like the Fourth Amendment in the United States, Section 8 prohibits 
agents of the state from conducting unreasonable searches or seizures.123 In 
exception to this general rule, Canadian “police have a common law power to 
search incident to a lawful arrest,”124 a power developed to promote efficiency 
in criminal investigations125 and justified by the state’s interest in protecting the 
safety of officers and others.126  
At its core, a search incident to arrest is legitimate when the underlying 
arrest is lawful, the search is truly incidental to the underlying arrest, and the 
search was conducted in a reasonable manner.127 According to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, “[t]his means, simply put, that the search is only justifiable 
if the purpose of the search is related to the purpose of the arrest.”128 
Additionally, and in contrast to the U.S. position in Robinson that the search is 
justified by the fact of the arrest itself, in Canada “the police officer’s motives 
and purposes for the search” are central to the question of whether the search is 
lawful.129 “That is, not only must a valid purpose objectively exist, but 
subjectively the officer must have made an individualized decision to conduct 
the search for that purpose,” otherwise the search is not truly incidental to the 
arrest.130 Like in Robinson, a valid arrest gives the officer the power to search 
(without any additional showing of suspicion or cause); however, in Canada, the 
officer must also be able to explain the purpose of the search and how it related 
to the arrest.131 There are three valid purposes: ensuring the safety of police 
officers or others, preventing the destruction of evidence, and discovering 
evidence (although, “[t]here remains some ambiguity in the case law over 
whether this third purpose relates to any evidence or is restricted to evidence that 
may go out of existence if the search was delayed”).132 
The search-incident-to-arrest exception can refer to either items (for 
example, a cigarette pack) or places (for example, automobiles) to be searched 
(including the area surrounding the arrestee). “The central guiding principle is 
that the search must be, as the case law puts it, truly incidental to the arrest.”133 
However, some particularly invasive searches, such as taking bodily samples, 
 
 123. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), § 8 (“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure.”). 
 124. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 1 (Can.). 
 125. Id. at para. 16 (“The cases teach us that the power to search incident to arrest is a focussed power given 
to the police so that they can pursue their investigations promptly upon making an arrest.”); R. v. Beare, [1988] 
2 S.C.R. 387, 404 (Can.) (The exception exists “to arm the police with adequate and reasonable powers for the 
investigation of crime” and because “[p]romptitude and facility in the identification and the discovery of indicia 
of guilt or innocence are of great importance in criminal investigations”). 
 126. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 85 (citing R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, para. 17 (Can.)). 
 127. Id. at 98. 
 128. Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 17.  
 129. COUGHLAN, supra note 115, at 99. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 102 (citing Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 25). 
 132. Id. at 100. 
 133. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 16 (Can.). 
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are not allowed incident to arrest, as they would constitute a “an ‘affront to 
human dignity.’”134 Although the power to search incident to arrest does, in 
some cases, allow officers to search a room, building, or vehicle in the 
immediate vicinity of the arrestee, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the highest 
court in the province) has held that such a power only extends to an arrestee’s 
home in exceptional circumstances, due to the arrestee’s heightened privacy 
interest in their home.135  
In R. v. Fearon, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the permissibility 
of a search conducted incident to arrest was dependent on “the nature of items 
seized, the place of search and the time of search in relation to the time of 
arrest.”136 Thus, “the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest will be 
affected by the particular circumstances of the particular arrest.”137 In Cloutier 
v. Langlois, the Supreme Court of Canada noted the purposes for which a search 
incident to arrest was lawful under the Charter, reaffirming the rule that “the 
police have a power to search a lawfully arrested person and to seize anything 
in his or her possession or immediate surroundings to guarantee the safety of the 
police and the accused, prevent the prisoner’s escape or provide evidence against 
him.”138 
2.  Searching Cellphones Incident to Arrest Prior to Fearon 
A number of Supreme Court of Canada cases have dealt with the search 
and seizure of computers or cellphones in a variety of search contexts. In R. v. 
Vu, for example, the court held that a search warrant for a home cannot extend 
to searching computers inside the home (if not specified in the warrant) on the 
traditional theory that receptacles (for example, cupboards and drawers) could 
be searched, because personal computers should be “treated . . . as a separate 
place” to be searched, and should require a separate warrant.139 
Prior to the SCC’s 2014 decision in R. v. Fearon, Canadian courts had not 
uniformly applied the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cellphone searches. 
In fact, in Fearon, the Supreme Court of Canada identified four different 
approaches taken by the lower courts. First, some lower courts had allowed 
cellphone searches incident to arrest—but only “provided that the search is truly 
incidental to the arrest.”140 Second, at least one decision allowed only “cursory” 
 
 134. Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at para. 15 (citing R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, para. 42 (Can.)). 
 135. R. v. Golub, [1997] 34 O.R. (3d) 743, para. 41 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (“[S]earches of a home as an incident 
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 136. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 13 (citing Caslake, 1 S.C.R. at paras. 15–16). 
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 138. Id. at para. 18 (quoting Cloutier v. Langlois, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158, 180–81 (Can.)). 
 139. R. v. Vu, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 657, paras. 48–52 (Can.). 
 140. Fearon, 3 S.C.R. at para. 2 (citing R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147, paras. 54–55, 62 (Can.); R. v. Otchere-
Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059, paras. 81, 83 (Can.); Young v. Canada, 2010 CarswellNfld 388, para. 45 (Can. Nfld. 
L. Prov. Ct.) (WL); R. v. Howell, 2011 NSSC 284, para. 33 (Can.); R. v. Franko, 2012 ABQB 282, para. 157 
(Can.); R. v. Cater, 2014 NSCA 74, para. 161 (Can.); R. v. D’Annunzio, (2010) 224 C.R.R. (2d) 221, paras. 23–
24 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). 
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searches of cellphones.141 Third, at least two cases held that “thorough ‘data-
dump’ searches are not permitted incident to arrest.”142 Fourth, at least one case 
held that cellphone searches were not permitted at all, “except in exigent 
circumstances, in which a ‘cursory’ search is permissible.”143 
In these cases, courts were frequently confronted with arguments that 
expanding the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to cellphones (and similar 
computing devices) would infringe arrestees’ “high informational privacy 
interests”144 in such devices. According to the defense counsel in one of these 
cases, “the capacity of electronic storage media to store vast quantities of 
information creates the potential for large-scale invasions of privacy.”145 
However, judges were not always convinced. In a decision among the first set 
of cases, one trial judge held that a search through emails on the arrestee’s phone 
for the limited purpose of securing evidence related to the underlying crime did 
not raise reasonable privacy expectations that were “different in nature from 
what might be disclosed by searching a notebook, a briefcase or a purse found 
in the same circumstances.”146 Another also found that the search of an unlocked 
and unencrypted phone raises lesser privacy concerns than a search of an 
encrypted and password-protected phone.147 
In the other three sets of cases, courts restricted the ability of police to 
search incident to arrest to varying degrees. In these cases (and other cases 
dealing with searches of cellphones outside the search-incident-to-arrest 
context), judges often focused on the informational privacy interests at stake.148 
In R. v. Polius, for example, the judge ruled that a person maintains a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of his/her cell phone” because “[t]he 
information in a cell phone, computer or other electronic device may relate to 
aspects of life that are deeply personal.”149 The court held that “the power to 
seize a cell phone during a [search incident to arrest] where there is reason to 
believe it may afford evidence of the crime does not include a power to examine 
 
 141. Id. (citing R. v. Polius, (2009) 196 C.R.R. (2d) 288, para. 41 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). 
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 144. R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147, para. 52 (Can.). 
 145. Id. at para. 49. 
 146. Id. at para. 6; see also R. v. Otchere-Badu, 2010 ONSC 1059, paras. 84–87 (Can.)  (holding that even 
if a search of a cell phone incident to arrest violated the Charter, the breach was “minimal” and not one that 
would undermine the reliability or admissibility of the evidence obtained). 
 147. Young v. Canada, 2010 CarswellNfld 388, para. 40 (Can. Nfld. L. Prov. Ct.) (WL). 
 148. See, e.g., R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, para. 118 (Can.) (“It seems to me that downloading the entire 
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warrantless search authorized under the common law as a search incident to arrest.”); R. v. Polius, (2009) 196 
C.R.R. (2d) 288, para. 52 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); R. v. T.O., 2010 ONCJ 334, paras. 32–46 (Can.) (WL) (“[T]he 
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cell phone.); R. v. Little, 2009 CarswellOnt 8024, para.147 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (finding that cell phones 
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 149. Polius, 196 C.R.R. (2d) at para. 52.  
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the contents of the cell phone without a prior judicial authorization, absent 
exigent circumstances.”150 
The judge also analogized a cellphone to a “locked briefcase,” stating that 
“[a] cell phone is the functional equivalent of a locked briefcase in today’s 
technologically sophisticated world.”151 Other cases equated cellphones with 
traditional computers.152 This is meaningful, because the Supreme Court of 
Canada has held that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, 
extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal 
computer.”153 This line of cases led the high court of British Columbia to find 
(just a few months prior to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Fearon) that “the 
law as it stands today no longer permits police to conduct warrantless searches 
of the entire contents of an individual’s cell phone.”154 
In Fearon, police arrested Fearon and an associate on suspicion of 
committing robbery. At the time of his arrest, officers conducted a pat-down 
search of his person, found a cellphone in his pocket, and conducted a cursory 
search of the phone.155 Police also searched his phone again within the next 
couple of hours. During these searches, police discovered two relevant photos 
and “a draft text message referring to jewellery and opening with the words ‘We 
did it.’”156 Fearon argued at trial and on appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
that the search of his phone violated his rights under Section 8 of the Charter. 
Both the trial judge and the Ontario Court of Appeals disagreed.  
The trial judge found that the arresting officer “was justified in his belief 
that the cell phone may contain evidence relevant to the armed robbery for which 
Mr. Fearon was being arrested” and that “there was a reasonable prospect of 
securing evidence of the offence for which the accused was being arrested in 
searching the contents of the cell phone.”157 The judge distinguished this initial 
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search of Fearon’s phone from the search conducted in Polius on the grounds 
that the officer in the earlier case “did not have a reasonable basis to believe that 
the cell phone may have been evidence of the alleged murder when he arrested 
the accused.”158 The judge dismissed the defendant’s arguments that phones 
should be excluded from the search incident to arrest power due to their capacity 
to store large amounts of personal information, stating 
  While there is no doubt that cell phones can contain significant amounts 
of personal information, the evidence in this case does not lead to the 
conclusion that Mr. Fearon had an extraordinarily high expectation of privacy 
in this phone. . . . There is no evidence that the phone was password protected 
or subject to any security barriers. Nor is there any evidence that it had “mini-
computer” capabilities like [phones in earlier cases].159 
The judge found it particularly persuasive that “[t]he cell phone in this 
case . . . was not ‘locked’ and had no password protection or other security walls 
on it.”160 Concluding, the trial judge stated that 
  In my view, an ordinary cell phone objectively commands a measure of 
privacy in its contents. However, the expectation of privacy in the information 
contained in the cell phone is more akin to what might be disclosed by 
searching a purse, a wallet, a notebook or briefcase found in the same 
circumstances. The evidence in this case is that the LG cell phone appears to 
have had the functions of cell phone operation, text messaging, photographs 
and contact lists. While certainly private, the information stored is not so 
connected to the dignity of the person that this court should create an exception 
to the police ability to search for evidence when truly incidental to arrest and 
carried out in a reasonable manner.161 
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings, 
affirming the reasonableness of the search and the officers’ conclusion that 
evidence of the robbery might be found on the phone.162 The court noted that 
they would have found the subsequent searches of the phone at the police station 
to be attenuated from the arrest, but that they would not overrule the trial judge’s 
findings that those searches were still incidental to the arrest.163 At a more 
general level, the court was also unwilling to announce a new rule carving 
cellphones out of the search-incident-to-arrest power, despite “the highly 
personal and sensitive nature of the contents of a cell phone and the high 
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expectation of privacy that they may attract.”164 In particular, the court reiterated 
findings from the trial court, stating that “it is significant that the cell phone was 
apparently not password protected or otherwise ‘locked’ to users other than the 
appellant when it was seized”165—if it had been, the court noted, police would 
then need to acquire a warrant prior to conducting a search.166  
3.  Fearon at the Supreme Court 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that warrantless searches of 
cellphones incident to lawful arrests comply with Section 8 of the Charter only 
when: (1) the arrest is lawful; (2) the search is truly incidental to the arrest and 
is conducted for the purpose of protecting the police, the accused, or the public, 
or to preserve or discover evidence; (3) the nature and the extent of the search 
are tailored to the purpose of the search; and (4) the police take detailed notes of 
what they have examined on the device and how it was searched.167 In doing so, 
the Court held that the searches conducted in the case were consistent with the 
existing common law power to search incident to arrest but that the law needed 
to be modified to ensure it stayed consistent with the Charter.168  
In its analysis, the Court found that “cell phone searches incidental to arrest 
may serve important law enforcement objectives,” including interests that 
surpass those of other types of searches in their importance to the state.169 
However, privacy interests were also heightened; indeed, “the search of cell 
phones, like the search of computers, implicates important privacy interests 
which are different in both nature and extent from the search of other 
‘places.’”170 The court also rejected analogizing cellphones to other types of 
containers searchable upon arrest (including briefcases or documents): 
It is unrealistic to equate a cell phone with a briefcase or document found in 
someone’s possession at the time of arrest. . . . [C]omputers—and I would add 
cell phones—may have immense storage capacity, may generate information 
about intimate details of the user’s interests, habits and identity without the 
knowledge or intent of the user, may retain information even after the user 
thinks that it has been destroyed, and may provide access to information that 
is in no meaningful sense “at” the location of the search.171 
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The Court also held that the individual capabilities of a cellphone, whether 
basic or advanced, should not be a determining factor and that the same test 
should be applied to both unsophisticated cellphones and smartphones (as well 
as “other devices that are the equivalent of computers”).172 The Court also 
largely rejected findings from the lower courts that the use of passwords was 
tied to the level of privacy interests an accused might have in the phone. “An 
individual’s decision not to password protect his or her cell phone does not 
indicate any sort of abandonment of the significant privacy interests one 
generally will have in the contents of the phone. Cell phones—locked or 
unlocked—engage significant privacy interests.”173 
However, the Court found that cellphone searches did not engage the same 
level of privacy intrusion as extracting bodily samples or conducting a strip 
search. While those sorts of searches “are invariably and inherently very great 
invasions of privacy and are, in addition, a significant affront to human dignity,” 
cell phone searches are not.174 According to the Court, 
while cell phone searches—especially searches of “smart phones”, which are 
the functional equivalent of computers—may constitute very significant 
intrusions of privacy, not every search is inevitably a significant intrusion. 
Suppose, for example, that in the course of the search in this case, the police 
had looked only at the unsent text message and the photo of the handgun. The 
invasion of privacy in those circumstances would, in my view, be minimal. So 
we must keep in mind that the real issue is the potentially broad invasion of 
privacy that may, but not inevitably will, result from law enforcement searches 
of cell phones.175 
The Court rejected a categorical prohibition on warrantless cell phone 
searches incident to arrest of the kind announced in Riley, finding that it was 
possible to “impose meaningful limits on the purposes, threshold and manner of 
such searches.”176 In the case at hand, the Court found that the initial search of 
Fearon’s phone violated the Charter, due to the fact that the prosecution could 
not provide “detailed evidence about precisely what was searched, how and 
why”177—evidence needed to meet the modified test announced by the Court 
(discussed at the beginning of this Subpart). However, the Court still ruled that 
the evidence obtained from the search should be admissible.178 
 
 172. Id. at para. 52 (“We should not differentiate among different cellular devices based on their particular 
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In determining whether a search of a cell phone is incidental to an arrest, 
the Court stated that, 
[b]oth the nature and the extent of the search performed on the cell phone must 
be truly incidental to the particular arrest for the particular offence. In practice, 
this will mean that, generally, even when a cell phone search is permitted 
because it is truly incidental to the arrest, only recently sent or drafted emails, 
texts, photos and the call log may be examined as in most cases only those 
sorts of items will have the necessary link to the purposes for which prompt 
examination of the device is permitted.179 
In dissent, Justice Karakatsanis (joined by Justices LeBel and Abella) 
emphasized the significant privacy interests that individuals have in relation to 
their computers and smartphones, the search of which can allow the police to 
see through the “windows to our inner private lives.”180 Indeed, the dissenting 
Justices noted, “[o]ur digital footprint is often enough to reconstruct the events 
of our lives, our relationships with others, our likes and dislikes, our fears, hopes, 
opinions, beliefs and ideas.”181 Therefore, “as technology changes, our law must 
also evolve so that modern mobile devices do not become the telescreens of 
George Orwell’s 1984.”182 In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice 
Karakatsanis argued that cell phone searches were akin to searches of homes or 
taking bodily samples: “In my view, searches of personal digital devices risk 
similarly serious encroachments on privacy.”183 
In conclusion, Justice Karakatsanis argued that the evidence should have 
been excluded. He wrote, 
the high privacy interest individuals have in their electronic devices tips the 
balance in favour of exclusion. Judicial pre-authorization is an essential 
bulwark against unjustified infringements of individual privacy. Unwarranted 
searches undermine the public’s confidence that personal communications, 
ideas and beliefs will be protected on their digital devices. This is particularly 
important given the increasing use and ubiquity of such technology. It is 
difficult to conceive of a sphere of privacy more intensely personal—or indeed 
more pervasive—than that found in an individual’s personal digital device or 
computer. To admit evidence obtained in breach of this particularly strong 
privacy interest, one of concern to an ever-increasing majority of Canadians, 
would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.184 
4.  Post-Fearon Case Law 
Since 2014, lower courts have applied the Fearon test in a variety of 
contexts and involving cursory and more detailed searches of arrestees’ cell 
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phones.185 Courts have referred to the four primary requirements laid out in 
Fearon as the “Fearon criteria.”186 Courts have applied these criteria in cases 
involving cellphones and smartphones of various sorts, as well as computers, 
tablets,187 USB flash drives,188 and GoPro cameras.189 One general takeaway 
from Fearon that pervades many subsequent cases is the notion that, 
[f]rom Fearon we also learn that police are not entitled to navigate through 
unsettled areas of the law by following the least burdensome route. As a 
general rule, faced with genuine uncertainty, police should err on the side of 
caution by settling on a course of action that is more, rather than less respectful 
of the accused’s privacy rights.190 
As in the United States, some Canadian courts have also made distinctions 
between searches that involve merely viewing a phone’s screen and those that 
involve manipulation of the phone to view additional contents. In the words of 
one trial court judge in British Columbia, “[i]t is, in my view, one thing to pick 
up such a device and to see on an open and visible screen a text conversation. It 
is quite another to do an in-depth analysis of all of the content.”191 While 
“picking up the phone and seeing an open screen and visible conversation” might 
be “no different than picking up a document like a driver’s licence or a letter or 
a note of some sort,” manipulating the phone to search through its contents is 
much more invasive.192 Another trial court judge found that activating a phone’s 
screen to see if it was locked or to prevent the phone from reverting to a locked 
state was minimally invasive, while searching through the phone’s contents was 
more “problematic.”193 In another, the fact that incriminating messages were 
plainly visible on the unlocked screen of the arrestee’s phone supported the 
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 193. R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.). 
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officers’ claim that the subsequent search of the phone was truly incidental to 
arrest and was directed at preserving and discovering evidence of the crime 
underlying the arrest.194  
However, based on the assertion in Fearon that “both locked and unlocked 
cell phones engage significant privacy interests,” one trial judge concluded that, 
“Fearon does not appear to distinguish between a cursory viewing of cell phone 
messages and those requiring some positive act on the part of the officer.”195 
Thus, according to the judge, merely viewing full or partial messages on the lock 
screen as they arrived could implicate Charter rights under Section 8.196 
Additionally, the judge found that accessing the phone and searching through 
recent instant messages was subject to the requirements for searches incident to 
arrest under Fearon, regardless of whether the phone was password-protected.197 
Indeed, according to the appellate court, when reviewing the trial court’s 
judgment, applying the “plain view” exception to searches of cellphones is 
fraught with difficulty, as “simply seeing the cellphone receive a number of 
messages and reading the names of the persons who had sent them” on the lock 
screen is often not enough to generate probable cause to seize the device, let 
alone conduct a more exhaustive search without a warrant.198 Yet, in other cases, 
courts have concluded that searches that involved short, focused examinations 
of an arrestee’s smartphone for specific evidence were permissible,199 while 
more exhaustive forensic analysis was not.200 
In R. v. Marakah, the SCC was asked to determine when a claimant might 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a text message, even after it was sent 
to a recipient (although this was not a search-incident-to-arrest case). The SCC 
held that a suspect could challenge the warrantless search of the recipient’s cell 
phone for messages sent by the suspect. This is so because the suspect can 
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in those messages.201 Interestingly, 
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 200. Jones, 2015 SKPC at para. 71 (finding that downloading and analyzing all content on a phone without 
a warrant violated Fearon’s third criterion). 
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the majority decision in Marakah defined the subject matter of the search at issue 
not as the text message recipient’s smartphone, but rather the “electronic 
conversation” of which the text messages were a part.202 The majority noted that 
the “[Section] 8 analysis must be robust” to the reality that where messaging 
“data are physically or electronically located varies from phone to phone, from 
service provider to service provider, or, with text messaging more broadly, from 
technology to technology.”203 Rather than simply looking at the search of a 
smartphone itself, the Court examined a number of factors that speak to whether 
the claimant held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the particular search at 
issue in the case, including “the place where the search occurred . . . the private 
nature of the subject matter” and whether the claimant maintained some “control 
over the subject matter.”204 Refusing to limit the place of the search to its origins 
as a physical, “territorial privacy interest,” the majority explained that, 
an electronic conversation does not occupy a particular physical place. All or 
part of it may be on the sender’s phone or the recipient’s, or in radio waves or 
a service provider’s database, or on a remote server to which both the sender 
and the recipient (or the recipients) have access, or some combination of these. 
This interconnected web of devices and servers creates an electronic world of 
digital communication that, in the 21st century, is every bit as real as physical 
space. . . . Although electronic, these rooms are the place of the search.205 
However, multiple courts have held that the privacy interest a suspect has 
in their electronic device (and thus, the seriousness of the intrusion by police 
during a search) is based on the type of information actually contained on the 
device and accessible to the police, regardless of whether the device itself 
“clearly ha[s] the potential to contain a great deal of personal information” due 
to its technological capabilities (for example, storage capacity).206 As 
summarized by one Ontario trial court, it is the “informational contents of a cell 
phone” that give rise to the “important privacy interests” in these cases.207 
 
 202. Id. at para. 17 (“To describe text messages as part of an electronic conversation is to take a holistic 
view of the subject matter of the search. This properly avoids a mechanical approach that defines the subject 
matter in terms of physical acts, spaces, or modalities of transmission. It also reflects the technological reality 
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 203. Id. at para. 19. 
 204. Id. at para. 24. 
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settled that the search of cell phones, like the search of computers, implicates important privacy interests which 
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 206. R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68, para. 72 (Can.); R. v. Ranglin, 2016 ONSC 3972, para. 99 (Can.) 
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C.  NETHERLANDS208 
1.  Overview of the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine 
In the Netherlands, the power of the police to conduct searches incident to 
arrest is tied inherently to the powers of the police to seize objects, which are 
spread across different statutory provisions regulating searches. As the 
following overview shows, in comparison to the common law systems in the 
United States and Canada, the Dutch civil law system is characterized by a 
detailed set of statutory rules that regulate a variety of search-related conduct 
(including but also expanding well beyond searches incident to arrest). Dutch 
law regulates different types of frisks,209 but for the purposes of this Article, the 
main forms of clothes and body searches are most relevant.  
The investigation of clothes has various forms. The least intrusive is 
frisking for identification purposes (identificatiefouillering): investigating 
officers who stop or arrest a suspect have the power to search the suspect’s 
clothes as well as the objects he or she is carrying at the time, at least insofar as 
necessary to establish the suspect’s identity.210 If necessary for identifying the 
suspect, police may also search handbags, suitcases, backpacks, or the personal 
items in a car—including searching the car’s glovebox.211  
More intrusive is the frisking for investigation purposes 
(opsporingsfouillering), which is regulated in the same provision as the 
investigation on the body.212 The prosecutor or assistant prosecutor can order an 
investigation of the clothes or on the body in the interest of the investigation; 
this is only allowed in cases of “serious objections” (ernstige bezwaren), a term 
indicating a higher level of suspicion than a “reasonable suspicion” (redelijke 
verdenking, a standard that is similar to probable cause): there must be a high 
likelihood that the suspect has committed the offense for which he was 
detained.213 Also, investigators can examine an arrested suspect’s clothes in 
cases of serious objections, but they are not allowed to search on the body.214 
The most intrusive is a search in the body, which we leave aside here since 
smartphones are (at least now or in the near future) not to be found inside bodies.  
For the purposes of this Article, the most relevant question is whether and 
to what extent law enforcement officers can search (the contents of) objects they 
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have seized in the context of a clothes or body search. This question is 
particularly relevant to smartphones that are seized by investigation officers in 
circumstances that do not require authorization from a prosecutor or judge. The 
traditional doctrinal answer to this question is simple: it is inherent to the seizure 
power—and implicitly embedded in the provisions on seizable items and seizure 
of goods incident to arrest215—that seized objects can be investigated in order to 
bring to light the truth.216 Traces on the object (for example, fingerprints) may 
be secured, and their contents may be investigated. Absent a specific rule that 
indicates otherwise, this general rule would also apply to smartphones, laptops, 
and other computer devices. 
2.  Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Prior to the “Smartphone 
Judgment” 
Until relatively recently, Dutch law followed the doctrine that computers 
simply were part of the traditional doctrine that the rules on seizure implicitly 
allow searching contents of seized objects.217 However, as smartphones grew in 
functionalities and data-processing capacities, questions arose whether it was 
acceptable to legitimate the privacy interference of computer searches incident 
to arrest implicitly on the basis of general rules without particular safeguards. 
The under-regulation of these searches (in particular, searches of smartphones) 
led to a split in lower courts’ case law. While courts had been following the 
traditional rule, in 2015, the Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden passed a 
forcefully formulated verdict breaking with this line.218 They determined that a 
police investigation of a seized smartphone violates article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):219  
The seizure, investigation of the smartphone and the copying of data from the 
smartphone by the police on the basis of art. 94 CCP infringe the right to 
protection of privacy established in article 8 ECHR. The police competence 
to infringe this right must written down in the law in a sufficiently knowable 
and foreseeable manner.  
The technological developments current in 2015 imply that a smartphone does 
not only provide access to traffic data, but also to the contents of 
communications and private information of the smartphone’s user. And this 
without any form of prior assessment of the subsidiarity and/or proportionality 
of the competence. This leads the court of appeal to determine that this is such 
an intrusive competence that, also taking into account art. 1 CCP [the legality 
principle], the general description of the competence of article 94 CCP can 
 
 215. Art. 94 SV (Neth.) (defining which items can be seized in the context of criminal procedure); Art. 95 
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nowadays no longer be deemed to be a legislative precept that can be deemed 
sufficiently knowable and foreseeable when exercising the competence. 
Therefore, it cannot (any longer) pass the test of article 8 ECHR. The court 
therefore agrees with the defence that the investigation by the police of the 
smartphone’s contents violates his right to privacy.220 
This judgment was quoted and followed by the District Court Noord-
Holland.221 However, a mere three weeks later, and without much argument, a 
different section of the same court stuck to the old doctrine, considering a police 
search of a smartphone incident to arrest to be lawful under the existing seizure 
provisions.222 The District Courts of Oost-Brabant and Limburg also upheld the 
existing doctrine that article 94 CCP provides a sufficient basis for warrantless 
investigations of a seized smartphone.223 The divergence in case law caused 
considerable legal uncertainty for law enforcement authorities, so that—in the 
absence of legislative reform, which would be the normal route in the Dutch 
civil law system to change the doctrine but would likely take years—a judgment 
by the Supreme Court was eagerly awaited.  
3.  The “Smartphone Judgment” at the Supreme Court  
On April 4, 2017, the Dutch Supreme Court passed three judgments on 
smartphone searches incident to arrest, which contained the same—extensive—
general reasoning, only differing in minor details based on the application to the 
facts of each case.224 Collectively, these judgments have become known as “the 
smartphone judgment” (het smartphonearrest).225 
Basically, the Supreme Court followed the Arnhem-Leeuwarden court in 
breaking with the doctrinal interpretation that smartphone searches were 
implicitly allowed under the traditional rules of search and seizure;226 it did not, 
however, go as far as to require warrants for all smartphone searches. Based on 
Art. 8 ECHR, which requires privacy interferences to be “foreseeable by law,” 
the court held that the general provisions on seizure (articles 94–95 CCP) only 
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allowed smartphone searches by police officers if the search can be considered 
to constitute a limited privacy intrusion:  
To establish the truth, seized objects may be searched in order to obtain data 
for the criminal investigation. Data stored in or available to computers are no 
exception to this (…). This also applies to data stored in or available to other 
seized electronic data carriers and computers, such as smartphones. The legal 
basis for this investigation by investigative officers lies in the combination of 
the provisions on which the power to seize is based.  
For an investigative officer to investigate seized electronic data carriers and 
computers in order to obtain data stored therein or available thereto, the law 
does not require prior assessment by a judge or intervention by a public 
prosecutor. If the privacy infringement of the investigation can be considered 
limited, the general power of investigative officers, stipulated in art. 94, in 
combination with art. 95 and 96 CCP, offers sufficient legitimation for this. 
This can be the case if the investigation only consists in consulting a small 
number of specific data stored on or available to the electronic data carrier or 
computer.227  
The inclusion of “or available to” suggests that smartphone searches may 
also consist in investigations of remotely stored data accessible through the 
phone, for example, in the cloud (provided that territory-based investigative 
jurisdiction is respected, of course).  
However, the Court went on to say, for more serious privacy intrusions, the 
general seizure provisions are insufficient for smartphone searches without 
further authorization:  
If the investigation goes as far as to result in a more or less complete image 
being obtained of certain aspects of the data carrier or computer user’s private 
life, the investigation might be unlawful vis-à-vis him. This can especially be 
the case if it concerns investigating with use of technical tools all data stored 
in or available to the electronic data carrier or computer. 
Given this, the view that Article 94 CCP always as such provides an adequate 
legal basis for an investigation officer’s investigation of a seized smartphone, 
is incorrect.228 
In expressing when an investigative action may constitute a more than 
limited privacy intrusion, the court used a criterion used elsewhere in statutory 
law on investigation powers, namely “systematicness” (stelselmatigheid).229 
This criterion entails that a more than limited privacy intrusion occurs when an 
investigation power is applied in a way that is “systematic,” which is the case if 
it results in “a more or less complete image being obtained of certain aspects of 
someone’s [private] life.”230 The use of this criterion was surprising (because it 
had been limited only to visual observation and intelligence-gathering powers), 
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 228. Id. at para. 3.4–3.5. 
 229. Article 126g, para. 1, SV (Neth.); Article 126j, para. 1, SV (Neth.).  
 230. COMMITTEE ON MODERNIZING, supra note 225, at 132–33. 
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but might be considered appropriate because it was one of the prevalent 
conceptualizations of privacy in Dutch law. The criterion resonates with the 
mosaic theory, the “more or less complete image” functioning similarly as the 
“mosaic picture” in the mosaic theory.231 Thus, the judgment also resonates with 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Riley.232 Similarly, the Canadian focus 
on protecting a “biographical core of personal information” is also aimed at 
limiting police investigations that tend to “reveal intimate details of the lifestyle 
and personal choices of the individual.”233 
An important difference with Riley, however, is that “systematicness” 
functions to distinguish between limited and more than limited searches, and not 
to identify when a warrant (or similar forms of judicial authorization under 
Dutch law) is required. The Dutch Supreme Court spent far fewer words on how 
privacy-invasive a smartphone search can be, and left it rather open when a 
judicial authority should authorize a smartphone search incident to arrest. A 
more than limited privacy intrusion requires some form of prior authorization, 
but this can be an order from a prosecutor or authorization from an investigatory 
judge. Both powers of public prosecutors and powers of investigatory judges are 
deemed sufficient to legitimate searches that yield a more or less complete image 
of certain aspects of the phone user’s private life.234 Whether a police officer 
desiring to investigate the contents of a seized smartphone should seek 
permission from a prosecutor or (through the prosecutor) from an investigatory 
judge, was largely left to practice. The only guidance that the Supreme Court 
gave was the statement that “in light of art. 8 ECHR, an investigation by the 
investigative judge can especially be thought of in cases where it is foreseeable 
in advance that the privacy infringement will be very serious.”235 
The Court did not elucidate which types of investigations constitute “very 
serious” privacy interferences. Neither, for that matter, did they articulate when 
exactly a search yields a more or less complete image of aspects of the user’s 
private life. The only guideline is the observation that if the court (that would 
re-judge the quashed case) were to find that in the case, all data on the 
smartphone and/or the SIM card had been retrieved using hardware and/or 
software (and possibly manually looked at as well) so that “[complete] insight 
has been obtained in contacts, call history, messages, and photos, this will give 
rise to the presumption that a more than limited privacy interference has 
occurred.”236 Although one could easily imagine that such comprehensive 
insight should definitely be considered a “very serious” privacy interference, the 
court refrained from making such a statement.  
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Altogether, the Supreme Court left a very considerable grey area between 
“consulting a small number of specific data”237 (as a limited privacy 
interference) and “investigating with use of technical tools all data”238 (as a 
presumably more than limited privacy interference), and between more than 
limited and “very serious”239 privacy interferences.  
4.  Post-“Smartphone Judgment” Case Law 
Several dozens of Dutch judgments have been published that refer to and 
apply the “smartphone judgment.”240 The general impression arising from these 
post-smartphone judgment cases is that, so far, courts tend to downplay the 
privacy interest and seldom find a smartphone search conducted by police to 
constitute a very serious privacy interference, as the following examples show.  
In many cases, courts hold that a smartphone search only concerned a 
limited privacy intrusion, particularly because, apparently or presumably, only 
few files had been investigated.241 For example, searching for a contact in the 
WhatsApp contact list and making a screenshot of the associated profile picture 
is a limited search,242 as is searching a suspect’s phone for confirmation of 
information found on a victim’s phone and finding some WhatsApp messages 
and conversations between suspect and victim as well as a photograph of the 
victim.243 Manually searching (scrolling) and looking at several videos was also 
held a limited privacy intrusion (even though two of these had been filmed inside 
a home),244 as was targeted looking at pictures in the photo gallery.245 One court 
even held that a large data set did not yield a more or less complete image of 
certain aspects of the suspect’s private life (and thus, was a limited privacy 
intrusion), arguing that most of the contacts found concerned first names or 
nicknames (further investigation into these persons largely having proved 
fruitless), that the suspect’s Facebook, WhatsApp, email, text messages, Internet 
history, and photos had a “very fragmented character,” and that “no 
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communications of a personal character” were found.246 Other factors favoring 
a conclusion of limited privacy interference include that the particular type of 
phone has limited functionality247 or that messages have a business rather than 
personal character.248  
While many cases thus concern minor privacy intrusions, we found only 
two cases involving a “very serious” privacy intrusion. Following the 
smartphone judgment, a public prosecutor requested that an investigative judge 
authorize a smartphone search in the so-called “sex bailiff” case (featuring a 
bailiff who compelled debtors to pay “in kind” rather than in cash).249 The 
investigative judge agreed with the prosecutor’s assessment that the 
investigation of the bailiff’s smartphone could uncover “certain photos, images, 
and other files” that could constitute a very serious interference with the 
suspect’s privacy, and authorized the search because of the serious character of 
the suspected sexual and official crimes.250 The other case also involved 
investigation of a sexual offense, namely uploading to public porn sites a 
covertly recorded video of (consensual) sex between the suspect and the 
victim.251 Since the suspect was an attorney, the public prosecutor expected that 
not only sexual images but also privileged information might be encountered in 
the search, and therefore requested permission from the investigatory judge.252 
The District Court of Noord-Holland stipulated that such permission should be 
granted, provided that the search remain limited to several precise, offense-
specific search terms (additional search terms requiring separate permission) and 
that it be conducted by a technical expert who was not part of the investigation 
team.253 
Given the Dutch Supreme Court’s mention that a privacy intrusion can be 
more than limited especially “if it concerns investigating with use of technical 
tools all data,”254 courts frequently mention the use of automated search tools as 
a possibly relevant factor—often to argue a contrario that a search was manual 
and hence not very intrusive.255 Even if all data are automatically copied from a 
smartphone, courts still consider that the privacy interference is limited, as the 
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following examples make clear. One court argued that making a mirror copy of 
the smartphone data and then using automated tools to investigate the data does 
not necessarily constitute “systematicness”:256 technical tools “can also, or 
perhaps rather, enable a limited search. Specifically, one can think of a search 
into a limited period or particular groups of files.”257 Another court simply, and 
in our view erroneously, argued that a search using forensic software tools of all 
textual data copied from an iPhone constituted only a minor privacy interference 
because the police officers “only investigated those data that they considered 
relevant to the investigation. It has not been substantiated that the phone was 
investigated for other purposes than finding evidence of the case for which the 
suspect was arrested.”258 This would suggest that any search of smartphone data 
could be conducted by police officers without higher authorization, as long as 
the search is targeted to the case at hand; that would effectively do away with 
privacy protection in criminal procedure.  
One important aspect of the Dutch post-smartphone judgment case law is 
that courts only seem to consider the privacy infringement of smartphone files 
that were eventually used in the case. They seldom consider how narrow or 
broad a search actually was, perhaps for lack of insight into what police officers 
actually did when searching the phone. This outcome-oriented rather than 
process-oriented perspective features in many cases, perhaps most visibly in the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s judgment that the large data set that the police 
had found turned out not to tell too much about the suspect’s personal life, 
because of the “fragmented” and business character of the contents.259 However, 
one could easily imagine that the Blackberry’s contact list could have contained 
not only first names and nicknames, but many full names, that more pictures 
might have been found than “a few pictures of the suspect with other women” 
(that is, other than his wife), which in itself might, in certain cases, already be 
considered a more than minor privacy infringement), and particularly that the 
suspect’s Facebook, WhatsApp, email (with attachments), text messages, 
Internet history, and photos on the suspect’s smartphone (a Samsung S4) might 
have revealed more than “fragmented” information about his private life.260 It is 
highly questionable to argue that some search activity constituted only a minor 
privacy intrusion if the information the search yields does not show a more or 
less complete image of certain aspects of someone’s private life; rather, the 
intrusiveness of the search ought to be based on an ex ante assessment of what 
the search is, in the circumstances, reasonably likely to yield in terms of 
information about private life.  
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Another striking, related aspect in Dutch case law is the focus on the 
privacy intrusion of the items that end up in the criminal file: courts do not seem 
to consider whether or not police officers have looked at, and taken knowledge 
of, many other smartphone items that they considered uninteresting or irrelevant 
to the case. It is plausible to argue that searching in the contact list for a particular 
contact, and finding a photo of the victim of a sexual offense on the suspect’s 
phone, are limited privacy intrusions; but if it is unknown what the police looked 
at in order to find these particular items, and what else they may have looked at, 
can one plausibly argue that the search, as such, was a minor privacy intrusion? 
From one administrative case, we can surmise that police investigations of 
seized smartphones may well involve a far broader range of items than the 
incriminating one(s) ending up in the criminal file.261 In this case, the plaintiff 
requested deletion of data from police records, arguing that the investigation of 
her seized smartphone had constituted a more than minor privacy interference 
and was therefore unlawful, given that the criminal file in the case against her 
contained one WhatsApp conversation with her son (featuring thirteen 
messages), parenthetically mentioning that “the entire printout of the file [of 
WhatsApp and text messages found on the seized phone] consists of 343 pages 
and was not included” in the file.262 The request was denied, both for procedural 
reasons and because the smartphone had been seized with authorization from the 
investigative judge (which surely covered the privacy intrusion of the 
investigation).263 However, the case is interesting because it shows that, even if 
only one WhatsApp conversation or text message is included in the file, the 
investigation may well have involved looking through all the conversations and 
messages on the phone—which to us definitely seems a more than limited 
privacy intrusion.  
One reason for this narrow perspective on privacy intrusiveness is the fact 
that courts generally argue that the privacy harm of a smartphone search consists 
of a police officer having been able to take knowledge of contents, but that the 
defense has not demonstrated that “taking knowledge of the suspect’s private 
data by the police officers has led, other than in the framework of the 
investigated criminal case, to any further dissemination of private data or any 
other concrete prejudice.”264 This is not to say that there is no privacy intrusion 
when police officers get to see private information, but the fact that data have 
only been seen by investigating officers and have not further spread is a reason 
for courts to consider the privacy violation to be excusable. This is all the more 
so since almost all cases concern investigations that happened prior to the 
smartphone judgment, so that police officers acted in good faith under then-
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applicable law. Also, courts point to a (somewhat gratuitous, in our opinion) 
statement by a public prosecutor that she would certainly have given 
authorization for the smartphone search, had she been asked at the time.265 As a 
result of these factors, even if courts consider that the authorization-lacking 
smartphone search constituted a more than minor privacy intrusion,266 they do 
not attach legal consequences to the privacy violation, other than noting that it 
happened.267 This is in line with the general finding that Dutch criminal 
procedure, with its limited sanctioning of unlawfully obtained evidence, tends 
to be pragmatic, placing more importance on fighting crime than protecting 
privacy.268 
5.  Statutory Reform: Modernizing the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure 
In 2014, the Dutch government started a large-scale process to modernize 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which dates from 1926 and, partly because the 
many amendments and changes since 1926 make it hard to see the forest for the 
trees, there is a need to update it in integral fashion.269 Another reason for 
modernization is the increasing role and special characteristics of digital 
investigations, and the fact that current law is not well-aligned to the realities of 
digital investigation practice. Computer searches incident to arrest are 
illustrative of this, as the Minister of Justice recognizes in the so-called Contour 
Memorandum:  
It is hard to justify that the investigation of a computer and securing data stored 
thereon during a search is covered by specific safeguards, while if that same 
computer would have been seized during the search, the investigation of that 
seized computer and the securing of the data stored thereon is not surrounded 
by similar safeguards. Moreover, on the basis of the separate seizure powers 
for investigation officers, for example with stopping and arrest, current law 
does not foresee in authorization from a higher authority for investigating for 
instance a seized smartphone and taking knowledge of the data stored 
thereon. . . . In this light, I consider it necessary to further regulate the 
investigation of seized electronic data carriers and the securing of the data 
stored thereon for investigation purposes. I am thinking of the requirement 
 
 265. See, e.g., Rb. Limburg 2 juni 2017, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2017:5133; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 22 maart 
2019, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2019:2508 (Neth.). 
 266. See, e.g., Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 17 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:4433 (Neth.) (finding that 
the copying of all data from a Blackberry phone and a notebook and the analysis of the images, video files, chats, 
emails, Internet history, and Skype data could yield a more or less complete image of certain aspects of the 
suspect’s private life). 
 267. See HR 10 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:1121 (Neth.);  Parket HR 15 mei 2018, 
ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:764 (Neth.); Hof Amsterdam 13 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:4153 (Neth.). 
 268. Parket HR 26 September 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245 (Neth.). 
 269. See Toespraak van minister Opstelten 1e Congres Modernisering Wetboek van Strafvordering [Speech 
by Minister Opstelten at the 1st Congress on Modernizing the Code of Criminal Procedure], RIJKSOVERHEID 
[GOV’T OF THE NETH.] (June 19, 2014) (Neth.), https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/toespraken/2014/ 
06/19/toespraak-van-minister-opstelten-bij-het-congres-modernisering-wetboek-van-strafvordering  
November 2020] LIMITS ON SMARTPHONE SEARCHES 269 
that a higher authority decides on investigating the seized electronic data 
carrier and the securing of the data stored thereon. . . .270  
A discussion memorandum on search and seizure explained just how 
intrusive computer investigations are:  
Taking knowledge of and securing the email correspondence, photos and 
videos, personal notes and Internet search history stored on a data carrier can, 
separately or combined, seriously interfere with the subject’s privacy. 
Compare the seizure of all photo albums, all video tapes, all personal letters, 
all personal notes (diaries) of a person suspected of for example drug 
trafficking. Such a seizure would easily be deemed disproportional.271  
Here, the argumentation compares investigating a seized smartphone or 
other type of computer with a very extensive use of seizure of objects normally 
stored in the home, and thus implicitly compares computer searches with 
dwelling searches (echoing the U.S. Supreme Court’s argumentation in Riley). 
It is therefore surprising that the memorandum and the subsequent draft Bill 
proposed that the Public Prosecutor would be the main authority with power to 
authorize smartphone searches incident to arrest rather than the investigatory 
judge—who is the regular authority to decide on dwelling searches.272  The draft 
Bill triggered considerable criticism from practitioners in the consultation stage 
on its regulation of digital investigation powers, including on the designation of 
the Public Prosecutor as the default authority for all investigations of digital 
devices (which would seem to offer too much protection for very simple devices, 
such as a bike chip with only an identification number, and possibly too little for 
extensive smartphone searches).273 In the meantime, the Supreme Court also 
passed the “smartphone judgment,”274 suggesting that “very serious” privacy 
interferences require authorization from the investigatory judge, also raising 
questions on the proposed draft Bill’s provisions. As a result, the government 
decided to install a committee to examine and advise them on the regulation of 
digital investigation powers in the modernized Code.275  
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This Committee on modernizing criminal investigation in the digital age276 
recommended applying a general criterion for assessing the intrusiveness of 
digital investigations, to searches of smartphones and laptops incident to arrest, 
as well as to computer investigations during searches of dwellings and other 
premises, and to various special investigation powers such as data production 
orders and open-source intelligence.277 Their proposed general criterion 
followed the existing criterion of “systematicness”278 and elaborated this into a 
threefold distinction of (profound) systematicness:  
• non-systematicness: a minor privacy intrusion; 
• systematicness: when (reasonably foreseeably) a more or less complete 
picture arises of certain aspects of someone’s private life; 
• profound systematicness: when (reasonably foreseeably) a more or less 
complete picture arises of a) an essential [wezenlijk] part of someone’s 
private life (“deep”) or b) a substantial part of someone’s private life 
(“broad”).279  
The committee tied these three degrees of intrusiveness to different 
authorization levels, requiring approval from the police, public prosecutor, and 
investigatory judge, respectively.280 Other conditions may apply to approval as 
well, such as differentiated levels of suspicion, types of offenses, and 
subsidiarity requirements.281 
The committee’s advice was taken up in the revised draft Bill of October 
2018, which adopted the threefold criterion of (profound) systematicness in the 
proposed regulation of, inter alia, computers seized incident to arrest.282 
According to the draft Explanatory Memorandum, the use of this criterion 
follows the committee’s advice, the Dutch Supreme Court’s smartphone 
judgment, and current practice following the latter judgment.283 The explanation 
of profound systematicness largely reiterated the committee’s explanation.284 
The draft Explanatory Memorandum provided examples to help interpret 
the abstract criterion. Non-systematic (a minor privacy intrusion), for example, 
are investigations of data carriers that intrinsically contain only few data, such 
as “bike chips” (only containing identification numbers for theft prevention), 
and manual investigations of a limited number of files on smartphones, for 
instance the most recent photos or videos on a smartphone seized from 
bystanders of nightlife violence, or looking up the username in certain apps.285 
Automated searches for evidence will normally constitute systematic 
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investigations, but if searches are highly targeted and offense-specific, for 
instance, images resembling a suspect’s graffiti tag, in which presumably only 
relevant (graffiti) pictures will show up, this is still non-systematic.286 In 
contrast, investigation officers manually scrolling through the entire collection 
of the past year’s pictures to look for graffiti pictures are conducting a systematic 
search (a more than minor privacy intrusion), since they can broadly take note 
of the suspect’s private life.287 Thus, even without copying search results, 
looking at all or many photos on a smartphone will be systematic.288 More 
generally, the Memorandum mentions various factors to take into account to 
determine whether investigation activities are (profoundly) systematic: number 
and type of data, whether data can be automatically investigated, type of data 
carrier, mode of storage, and automation of the investigation.289 How these 
factors can be applied will be explained in more detail for open-source 
investigations in the future Explanatory Memorandum of the final Bill that is to 
be submitted to parliament sometime in 2020.290 
II.  DISCUSSION 
In Part I, we extensively described how courts (and, in the Netherlands, 
legislators) assess the intrusiveness of smartphone searches incident to arrest. In 
this Part, we will analyze and compare these findings, starting with explaining 
the framework of our analysis.  
A.  THEORETICAL LENS: CONTENT AND CONTAINER APPROACHES TO 
PROTECTING PRIVACY 
In previous research, we analyzed how legislators and courts assess the 
intrusiveness of new (manifestations of) police investigation methods by 
examining which privacy frameworks they resort to in response to privacy-
intrusive conduct by police.291 We are interested in this question because privacy 
protection in the law is often not achieved using an abstract concept of privacy, 
but through more concrete proxies that capture relevant elements of privacy. 
Legal frameworks protect, for instance, privacy of the home, letters, writings, 
communications, bodies, thoughts, property, family, social relations, and 
identity.292 These proxies help make privacy concrete, which enhances legal 
certainty, both for citizens (to know how their privacy may legitimately be 
infringed by the police under criminal procedure rules) and police (to know 
under which conditions they may infringe privacy when conducting 
investigative activities). Although such proxies are intrinsically imperfect (they 
can never fully capture privacy, given privacy’s complex, multi-faceted, and 
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context-dependent character); but, generally, they work well enough to protect 
privacy, striking an apposite balance between abstractness and concreteness of 
the law. However, over time, proxies can become less suitable for protecting 
privacy due to socio-technical change.293 In the current data-pervasive and 
ubiquitously connected world, older proxies such as privacy of the home and 
secrecy of communications content have become less powerful at capturing what 
privacy means in today’s age.294 Our broader research over the past years has 
therefore analyzed whether new privacy proxies could better capture what 
privacy means in the twenty-first century.  
A major insight derived from this research is that there are (at least) two 
different general types of privacy protection in the law: container-based 
approaches and content-based approaches.295 Container-based approaches, for 
instance, protect the home, communications channels, and “boxes, 
bags . . . wrapped packages, glove compartments, and locked trunks”296 as per 
se protection-worthy spaces, independent from their actual contents.297 A 
dwelling, for instance, is protected from a search even if nothing privacy-
relevant is actually stored there; a communication channel is protected against 
wiretapping even if it transmits only non-personal or non-private 
communications. In contrast, content-based approaches focus on content as per 
se protection-worthy, independent from the specific container that holds it. For 
instance, data protection law protects personal data or personally identifiable 
information as such, regardless of whether the information is stored in a private 
or public space, stored in a closed container, or openly visible.  
In our research, we found that “there is increasing discomfort with the 
answers . . . yielded by the traditional privacy frames” to assess the intrusiveness 
of location tracking by police,298 and that the 
adequacy of [the classic privacy] frames in assessing the intrusiveness of 
police hacking is limited . . . . Across the jurisdictions, we observe the 
contours of two such new frames emerging: a container-based approach 
focusing on the computer as protection-worthy in itself and a content-based 
approach focusing on the data.299 
We concluded that the two new frames “complement each other in their 
capacity to serve as a yardstick to assess the intrusiveness of police hacking (and, 
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perhaps, of criminal investigation powers in digital contexts more generally)” 
and hypothesized “that a combination of both is likely to be the most suitable 
new framework for evaluating the intrusiveness of police hacking.”300 
Now, we want to test whether, to what extent, and how a combination of 
container- and content-based approaches could be a suitable framework for 
assessing the intrusiveness of police investigations. The context of smartphone 
searches incident to arrest is particularly suitable for this, with many and varied 
cases in the three jurisdictions outlined in Part I, above. Through the lens of the 
framework of container- versus content-based approaches, we analyze, first, 
how container and/or content approaches feature in search-incident-to-arrest 
cases in the jurisdictions we studied, and second, how preferences for container 
or content approaches, or combinations thereof, play out in this context.  
B.  CONTAINER AND CONTENT ARGUMENTS 
In all three jurisdictions, we see similar argumentation for why the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine should apply differently to smartphones (and other 
types of computers) than to traditional objects. The difference between a ride on 
horseback and a flight to the moon is simply too substantial. All jurisdictions 
recognize that, generally, smartphones are devices that potentially contain a vast 
amount of diverse and privacy-sensitive information. Combined with 
smartphones’ large storage capacity as a significant factor,301 the mosaic 
theory302 functions, albeit implicitly, as an important privacy framework here. 
As the Riley court observed, “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct 
types of information . . . that reveal much more in combination than any isolated 
record. . . . The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through 
a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.”303 
Similarly, the dissent in Fearon argued that smartphone searches allow the 
police to see through the “windows to our inner private lives.”304 The Dutch 
criteria of systematicness (“a more or less complete image being obtained of 
certain aspects of [the user’s] private life”)305 and of profound systematicness 
(that is, when “a more or less complete picture arises of a) an essential . . . or b) 
a substantial part of someone’s private life”)306 likewise use mosaic metaphors 
(pictures resulting from a data set) to highlight privacy intrusiveness.  
An additional factor plays a role here: the ease of obtaining mosaic pictures 
because of the prevalence of modern-day smartphones. Traditional objects that 
can reveal significant parts of private life, such as (printed) photographs or 
diaries, may also occasionally be found on arrestees, but these are exceptional 
cases; in contrast, smartphones are likely found in most cases. Thus, the default 
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situation flips from an incidental finding to an almost routine investigation of 
private life if objects found on or near an arrestee are seized and searched.307 
The ubiquity of smartphones significantly reduces the effort police have to make 
to gather data and, thus, the cost of investigation. This factor, as Matthew 
Tokson has recently argued, is a major factor in Fourth Amendment privacy 
assessments.308 
Essentially, we observe courts combining container-based and content- 
based arguments: smartphones (as devices or containers) are special because 
they generally contain content that, in combination, reveals a mosaic picture of 
private life; and smartphone contents (information, data, or links between data) 
are special because, crucially, smartphones combine different functions, are 
ubiquitous, and have large storage capacity. These are mutually reinforcing 
rationales: smartphones are particularly protection-worthy because of key 
characteristics of their contents, and smartphone contents are particularly 
protection-worthy because of key characteristics of their container.  
What emerges most strikingly from our comparative overview, is that 
while the underlying reasoning of smartphone searches of potentially high 
intrusiveness is similar (namely that a smartphone search can easily result in an 
intrusive mosaic picture of someone’s private life), the conclusions drawn from 
this reasoning differ significantly. The Riley court (similarly to the Fearon 
dissent) concluded that because smartphones “as a category” often contain so 
much private information, they should be protected categorically from 
warrantless searches.309 Thus, U.S. doctrine applies a container approach to 
privacy protection, defining smartphones310 as per se protection-worthy privacy 
spaces—regardless of what the specific smartphone in an individual case 
actually contains. In contrast, the majority in the Fearon case and the Dutch 
Supreme Court concluded that because smartphones often contain so much 
private information, their contents should be protected from warrantless 
searches. Rather than give categorical protection to smartphones, these courts 
held that the intrusiveness of a search depends on what is actually investigated. 
Thus, Canadian and Dutch doctrines apply a content approach to privacy 
protection, protecting smartphones (and other computers) against intrusive 
searches depending on which data are (likely to be) investigated, and thus also 
depending on what the specific smartphone in a particular case actually contains. 
We conclude that the United States legal framework has adopted a 
container approach, while the Canadian and Dutch frameworks have adopted a 
content approach. Given our finding from earlier research that both approaches 
have limitations, and our hypothesis that a combination works best,311 it is 
 
 307. See supra notes 75–76, 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 308. Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 
25 (2020) (arguing that the cost of investigation, besides the intimacy of the place or thing targeted and the 
amount of information sought, is a consistent principle in Fourth Amendment privacy assessments). 
 309. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014). 
 310. Defining smartphones here possibly includes similar devices. See infra Part II.C.1.  
 311. See supra notes 276–279 and accompanying text. 
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interesting to further analyze the advantages and drawbacks of the different 
frameworks adopted by the three jurisdictions, and how these jurisdictions 
attempt to mitigate the drawbacks of their adopted approaches.  
C.  CONTAINER PROTECTION 
1.  Advantages and Drawbacks 
Under the container approach, the smartphone is considered an object 
worthy of protection in and of itself, and thus functions as a new proxy for 
privacy protection. The protection resembles home protection, where the 
dwelling functions as a classical proxy for privacy protection: both are spaces 
enclosing a large part of private life. The Dutch discussion memorandum 
compared looking through all the information on a seized smartphone to “the 
seizure of all photo albums, all video tapes, all personal letters, all personal notes 
(diaries) of a person,”312 similar to the First Circuit court’s argument in Wurie 
that “[a]t the touch of a button a cell phone search becomes a house search.”313 
SCOTUS in Riley even considered that “a cell phone search would typically 
expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house,” 
making smartphones an even more important privacy space than the home (at 
least in terms of government interference).314 It does not really matter whether a 
protection-worthy space is physical or virtual—in the words of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, the “electronic world of digital communication . . . is every bit 
as real as physical space” and can serve as “the place of the search.”315 This 
recognition of smartphones as the new “home” locus of private life resonates 
with the concept of the “digital home” that emerges in some jurisdictions as an 
important new privacy framework.316  
The container approach can serve as a powerful and practical analytic tool 
for guiding police work on the ground. Indeed, the primary benefit of the 
container approach is that it can provide clear-cut, bright-line rules governing 
police investigations and the issuance of warrants. In Canada and the 
Netherlands, police officers must decide whether their intended investigation of 
a smartphone is sufficiently limited to not require a warrant—not an easy 
decision, given that the answer depends on many factors.317 For U.S. police 
 
 312. RB Noord-Holland, 29 juli 2019, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2019:6764 (Neth.). 
 313. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 8–9 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 
F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)). Although the Flores-Lopez court found that evidence preservation concerns in 
that case outweighed any invasion of privacy, the court upheld the warrantless search of the cell phone, because 
the search at issue was minimally invasive—only directed at discovering the phone’s number. Flores-Lopez, 
670 F.3d at 810.  
 314. Riley, 573 U.S. at 396. 
 315. R. v. Marakah, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 608, para. 28 (Can.). 
 316. See Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1056–58 (discussing the emergence of “informatic home” as a 
new privacy frame). 
 317. See infra Part II.D.2.b. 
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officers wanting to investigate a seized smartphone incident to arrest, the answer 
is very simple: “get a warrant.”318  
A corollary of this is that the Canadian and Dutch jurisdictions grant some 
discretionary power of the police to conduct (simple or minimal) smartphone 
searches, which may be stretched, abused, or hidden from oversight, and which, 
therefore, require some measure to keep this discretionary power in check.319 
The United States has no need for such measures, since even simple or minimal 
smartphone searches are not allowed.  
The simplicity of the container approach is, however, not only an 
advantage but also a drawback. It is a crude, black-and-white approach that treats 
all devices alike: smartphone searches categorically require a warrant, regardless 
of specifics.320 This has three major consequences. First, in this approach, the 
only limitation of police smartphone searches lies in the access point: to get in, 
police need a warrant. But once a warrant is granted and police can enter, the 
container protection is lost, no longer offering any guidance as to what can be 
investigated within the container (unless the warrant itself includes restrictions 
established by the issuing judge). This contrasts with the content-based 
protection’s more nuanced approach, which focuses directly on regulating the 
search of the phone’s contents.321 
A second consequence is that much hinges on the qualification of a certain 
device as pertaining to the category that has container protection. When exactly 
is a computing device functionally equivalent to “[m]odern cell 
phones . . . [w]ith all they contain and all they may reveal”322 that merit Riley’s 
container protection? This question should be answered for many types of 
devices that resemble, in some sense but not in all senses, modern cellphones, 
including laptops, tablets, smart watches, USB drives, digital cameras, and in-
car computers. So far, the question seems to have been addressed (not 
necessarily authoritatively) to a limited range of information carriers, such as 
laptops323 and digital cameras.324 However, practitioners and courts may have to 
grapple for a considerable period with classifying other devices under 
SCOTUS’s reasoning and holding in Riley. Additionally, there exists some 
ambiguity in whether, or how, the law should apply differently to searches of 
“subcontainers” (for example, separate files, folders, apps, or directories that 
exist inside a broader digital “container” such as a cellphone).325 Moreover, this 
question will need to be continuously answered for future devices that currently 
are not sufficiently cellphone-like to be covered by Riley but that may become 
 
 318. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
 319. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 320. Cf. Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1079 (articulating the crudeness of the container approach). 
 321. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 322. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. 
 323. United States v. Lichtenberger, 786 F.3d 478, 487–91 (6th Cir. 2015).  
 324. United States v. Whiteside, No. 13 CR 576 PAC, WL 3953477, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015). 
 325. See Michael Mestitz, Note, Unpacking Digital Containers: Extending Riley’s Reasoning to Digital 
Files and Subfolders, 69 STAN. L. REV. 321, 323 (2017). 
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equivalent when new functions are added. In that sense, the container approach 
is technology-specific and may not be very sustainable over time.  
A third consequence of the black-and-white container approach is that even 
simple or minimal investigations require a warrant. For instance, accessing the 
call log on a phone to acquire the number of incoming calls that were visible on 
the screen as “my house”326 is no longer possible without a warrant under Riley, 
although such activity is very far removed from assembling a mosaic-like picture 
or a typical (let alone an exhaustive) house search. Allowing, as Canada and the 
Netherlands do, such simple, targeted search activities by police officers without 
higher authorization seems reasonable. In adopting categorical container 
protection for smartphones, SCOTUS has rightly differentiated smartphone 
searches from investigations of traditional objects such as bags or cigarette 
packages (which are comparatively “rides on horseback”327); but it has also 
effectively treated all smartphone searches as comparable to flights to the moon. 
Yet there are many ways of getting from A to B, and depending on your goal, 
you might choose between many different modes of travel: walking, cycling, 
driving a car, taking a high-speed train or transatlantic flight, or engaging in 
space travel. Smartphone searches can have different goals, and do not always—
indeed, often do not—take the form of the high end of the spectrum; several 
types of simple searches the police might want to conduct quickly following 
arrest are more comparable to rides on horseback than to spaceflight. In this 
sense, the sole reliance on the container approach to protecting privacy in the 
search-incident-to-arrest context will likely overprotect privacy at the expense 
of police investigations. 
2.  Mitigating the Drawbacks 
The first drawback of the black-and-white container approach—only 
regulating access to the device but not the scope of the search of the device’s 
contents—is relatively easily mitigated by the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement.328 Warrants must circumscribe what may and may not 
be investigated in the seized phone.329 Thus, the intrusiveness of smartphone 
searches is primarily regulated by another normative framework in U.S. legal 
doctrine—regulating the issuance of, and compliance with, warrants—than by 
the container protection of smartphones. This is not in itself an issue, but it does 
limit the thrust of using smartphones as a new proxy for privacy protection in 
terms of finding new frameworks for making privacy assessments; the container 
 
 326. See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 327. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
 328. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that warrants shall 
particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the 
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion 
of the officer executing the warrant.”).  
 329. See, e.g., United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1244–46 (10th Cir. 2017) (finding that “a 
‘recognizable line’ [exists for] considering how much particularity is required for computer searches” and 
holding that a warrant to search a cell phone was invalid since it failed to “specify what material (e.g., text 
messages, photos, or call logs) law enforcement was authorized to seize”). 
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approach, in this sense, may not easily be usable in other legal systems that lack 
something like the United States’ strict particularity requirement for limiting 
searches.  
In a similar vein, the second drawback—having to determine whether each 
different type of device belongs to the class of protected containers—seems a 
feature of the U.S. common law system itself, in which the facts of each case 
have to be analyzed on the basis of their resemblance to precedent. Courts are 
used to dealing with questions concerning the similarities and differences 
between a present case and existing doctrine; it is perhaps less a drawback than 
a systemic feature that courts must determine whether each digital device falls 
within Riley’s conception of modern cellphones. This does not, however, 
diminish the legal uncertainty that practitioners may experience when police 
want to investigate a digital device that is not a cellphone but that also stores 
potentially much and/or varied information. Legal certainty can only be acquired 
over time, when cases involving different devices reach higher courts and 
receive authoritative judgments.  
The third drawback—the overprotective prohibition of any warrantless 
smartphone search, however minimal—is more challenging to mitigate. The 
main workaround we have observed in post-Riley cases is the application of the 
plain-view doctrine, exempting searches of the smartphone’s screen from 
Riley’s warrant requirement, because there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in something in plain view.330 This fits well in the container approach, 
since container protection typically protects the inside of containers, not what is 
visible on their outside. It is plausible to consider what is visible on the screen 
(without manipulating the device, because hitting any key or touchscreen might 
show something of the device’s contents that was not visible before) as falling 
under the plain-view exception. However, there is arguably a relevant difference 
between smartphone screens and the outsides of traditional containers. While 
the latter are usually static, the former can be dynamic: if a smartphone is seized, 
the screen may still show (notifications of) incoming messages, without any 
intervention by police or the smartphone user. Although such (notifications of) 
incoming messages are plainly visible for the police, they were not visible at the 
time of seizure. Whether this difference matters (or should matter), in practice, 
for the plain-view doctrine remains an open question—although, given the 
general analysis offered by the Supreme Court in Riley, there may be room for 
adapting the plain-view doctrine in this context as well. 
A second mitigation strategy is that certain contexts are exempted from 
Riley’s standards, because the context implies a lower reasonable expectation of 
privacy, for example, if the smartphone belongs to a parolee.331 These exceptions 
limit the container approach’s overprotection of privacy somewhat, but of course 
do not cover the bulk of typical search-incident-to-arrest cases. 
 
 330. See supra notes 96–99, 105–109 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
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Other than plain-view situations of what is visible on smartphone screens 
and some context-specific special situations, we have not found major strategies 
to mitigate the overprotective reach of Riley’s categorical protection of 
smartphones by lower U.S. courts. We think that two additional mitigation 
strategies may be envisioned. First, law enforcement could argue that certain 
cursory investigations, such as those allowed under Canadian and Dutch 
doctrines without a warrant, do not constitute a Fourth Amendment “search” or, 
even if they do, that they are objectively reasonable in situations where the 
suspect or arrestee does not maintain any reasonable expectation of privacy.332 
Second, law enforcement could argue that the device at issue is not, in effect, a 
Riley type of protected device. Although Riley covers not only smartphones but 
also simpler types of cellphones (such as a “flip phone” exhibiting “a smaller 
range of features than a smart phone”),333 its reasoning rests on the particular 
affordances of smartphones, including their large storage capacity and their 
multifunctionality and prevalence (allowing multiple data types to be recorded 
in widely varying contexts). In concrete cases involving a cellphone with only a 
few functions, so that the cellphone in question is incapable of actually revealing 
a mosaic-like picture of (part of) someone’s private life, let alone of the 
“privacies of life,” it might, perhaps, be plausibly argued that this device falls 
outside the Riley category of protected devices.  
Whether such strategies could work sufficiently to mitigate the drawbacks 
of the bright-line, black-and-white approach of container protection is 
something we cannot presume to answer here. Case law is still developing 
dynamically post-Riley; time will tell how practice and jurisprudence manage to 
address the challenges we discussed here.  
D.  CONTENT PROTECTION 
1.  Advantages and Drawbacks 
Under the content approach, the contents of smartphones are considered 
protection-worthy, rather than the device itself. This is because “searches of 
‘smart phones’ . . . may constitute very significant intrusions of privacy, [but] 
not every search is inevitably a significant intrusion.”334 Instead of regulating 
access to the device as the key activity, content-based protection “impose[s] 
meaningful limits on the purposes, threshold and manner of such searches.”335 
Thus, content protection focuses, in particular, on the totality of data that are 
 
 332. This might look something like an extension of the analyses offered by U.S. judges in United States v. 
Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[The officer’s] actions simply do not amount to a search of Brixen’s 
cell phone. He did not open or otherwise manipulate Brixen’s phone. Nor did he gain access to any of the phone’s 
content or attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”) and United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 
229, 238 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The police did not attempt to retrieve any information from within the phone.”), 
although both of these cases rested somewhat on the plain-view doctrine in coming to their respective 
conclusions. 
 333. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 380 (2014). 
 334. R. v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 54 (Can.). 
 335. Id. at para. 63 (emphasis added). 
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investigated and that may, in their combination, create a revealing picture of 
(parts of) someone’s private life. The protection resembles, or may even be seen 
as being based on, the framework of the mosaic theory, which is emerging in 
several jurisdictions around the world as an important new privacy 
framework.336  
The benefits and drawbacks of the content approach largely mirror the 
drawbacks and benefits of the container approach outlined in the previous Part, 
so we shall not elaborate on those here. Briefly put, the main benefit of the 
content approach is its flexibility (as opposed to the crudeness of the black-and-
white container approach), allowing, for instance, warrantless cursory searches 
and focusing on data actually (envisioned to be) investigated rather than on the 
question of whether the device belongs to the category of protected devices.  
Its main drawback is the complexity that comes along with its flexibility 
(as opposed to the simple, bright-line character of the container approach). The 
content protection depends on the estimated level of intrusiveness of a search: 
limited, shallow intrusions trigger limited protection; broader or deeper 
intrusions trigger stronger protection. Whether an intrusion is (likely to be) 
limited (shallow) or broad (deep) depends on many factors, related to both the 
search activity and the device in question. Since investigating officers only have 
to apply for higher authorization if the privacy intrusion is more than limited, 
the officers face the challenge of assessing, on the ground and in the moment, 
whether their envisioned investigation remains below or goes beyond the 
threshold of intrusiveness—a threshold that is not particularly well-defined. Not 
only does this bring along legal uncertainty, the discretionary power for making 
the initial assessment also raises questions of control and oversight of police 
investigations. How do Canada and the Netherlands deal with these challenges 
to the content approach?  
2. Mitigating the Drawbacks 
To off-set the problem of overly complex intrusiveness assessments, both 
jurisdictions offer sets of criteria or factors that should be taken into account 
when determining whether an envisioned investigation meets the threshold of 
intrusiveness: Canada has the Fearon criteria,337 the Netherlands has the 
threefold criterion of (profound) systematicness and an associated list of factors 
influencing the level of intrusiveness.338 We can distinguish two mitigation 
strategies here, aiming to make the complex intrusiveness assessment simpler 
and more manageable for practitioners, and one strategy to ensure oversight of 
warrantless searches.  
 
 336. See supra Part II.B; see also Škorvánek et al., supra note 18, at 1073–78 (discussing the “informatic 
privacy” and the mosaic theory as an emerging new privacy frame); Koops et al., supra note 18, at 693–95 
(showing the emergence of the mosaic theory in the U.S. and in other jurisdictions as a new privacy frame). 
 337. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 338. See supra notes 276–281, 289 and accompanying text.  
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 a.  Guiding Examples of Levels of Intrusiveness 
First, both jurisdictions have developed relatively abstract criteria,339 which 
are sufficiently general to allow covering many situations and to be sustainable 
over time. Abstract criteria or general principles do not offer much concrete 
guidance, but that is offset by courts applying the criteria or principles to 
concrete cases over time, building up a collection of illustrative, and therewith 
perhaps authoritative, examples of investigations that do or do not cross the 
relevant threshold. The case law following the supreme court cases in both 
jurisdictions already gives interesting indications, generating the following 
picture of different levels of intrusiveness distinguished by courts. Note that this 
list is indicative; it can serve as a first inventory of examples but, given that they 
often derive from lower-court case law, they cannot (yet) be considered 
authoritative.  
Level 1: low intrusiveness (implying police can conduct such searches 
without higher authorization).  
• Activating a phone’s screen to see if it is locked or to prevent the 
phone from reverting to a locked state.340 
• Observing (copying) what is in plain view, for example, a 
conversation on the screen of a seized phone, or notifications 
appearing there.341 
• A targeted, offense-related search for a relatively small number of 
specific data,342 for example, missed calls or messages,343 a 
contact in the WhatsApp contact list and the associated profile 
picture,344 some videos,345 pictures in the photo gallery (if there is 
no indication that the photo gallery has very many pictures that 
might be seen in passing),346 the most recently made photos or 
videos347 or recent text messages,348 looking up the user name in 
certain apps,349 or checking for camera capacity and Internet 
access.350 Note that several U.S. cases involve activities of this 
kind, such as retrieving the phone number of an incoming message 
from the call log, viewing call logs or text messages, or verifying 
a phone’s number; while considered intrusive in the United States 
 
 339. See supra Parts I.B.3, I.C.3. 
 340. R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.). 
 341. R. v. Khosravi, 2018 BCSC 1791, para. 47 (Can.); United States v. Brixen, 908 F.3d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 
2018). But see R. v. Kossick, 2017 SKPC 67, para. 86 (Can.). 
 342. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4 (Neth.). 
 343. Parket HR 26 september 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1245, para. 3.12 (Neth.). 
 344. Hof Den Haag 11 juli 2018, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:2524 (Neth.). 
 345. Parket HR 28 november 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:1470, para. 25–26 (Neth.). 
 346. Parket HR 15 mei 2018, ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:764, para. 10 (Neth.). 
 347. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22. 
 348. R. v. Jones, 2015 SKPC 29, para. 62 (Can.). 
 349. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22. 
 350. R. v. Bourdon, 2016 ONSC 2113, para. 383 (Can.). 
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in meeting the Riley standard, these would not likely be considered 
(very) intrusive in Canada and the Netherlands.351  
• Investigating a data carrier that intrinsically contains only few data, 
such as chips with an identification number.352  
Levels 2 and 3: intermediate and high intrusiveness (implying police 
need a warrant (Canada) or permission from the prosecutor or investigative 
judge (Netherlands) for such searches).353  
• Manipulating the phone to search through its contents.354 (Whether 
the search meets the threshold of level 2 may, however, depend on 
the extent and how targeted the search is; minimal manipulation 
for targeted cursory searches might fall under level 1.)  
• Downloading the entire contents of a cell phone or smartphone.355  
• A more exhaustive forensic analysis (such as downloading and 
analyzing all content)356—in other words, investigating with use 
of technical tools all data stored in or available to the device,357 
such as acquiring (complete) insight in contacts, call history, 
messages, and photos,358 or analyzing the images, video files, 
chats, emails, internet history, and Skype data.359 
• Searching for evidence of a sexual offense, in which “certain photos, 
images, and other files” of an intimate character (potentially also 
including victims) could well be revealed; this can be considered 
highly intrusive (level 3).360  
b.  Factors Influencing Intrusiveness 
Because guiding examples are case-specific, usually a combination of 
different facts of the case plays a role in assessing a search as exhibiting low, 
intermediate, or high intrusiveness. Examples cannot easily be transposed to 
new cases, which often involve slightly different circumstances. A 
complementary important mitigation strategy is, therefore, to offer a set of 
factors that practitioners and courts can or should consider in assessing the 
 
 351. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)); see supra note 92 
and accompanying text. 
 352. Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 21–22. 
 353. Canadian case law only distinguishes two levels (searches that do not or do require a warrant). Dutch 
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 354. R. v. Khosravi, 2018 BCSC 1791, para. 47 (Can.); R. v. Roberto, 2018 ONSC 847, para. 13 (Can.). 
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Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 373 (2014). 
 355. R. v. Mann, 2014 BCCA 231, para. 118 (Can.); see also R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, para. 32 
(Can.). 
 356. R. v. Jones, 2015 SKPC 29, paras. 62–66 (Can.). 
 357. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4 (Neth.). 
 358. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:584, para. 2.7.2 (Neth.). 
 359. Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 17 oktober 2017, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2017:4433 (Neth.). 
 360. Rb. Limburg 8 mei 2017, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2017:4484 (Neth.). 
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intrusiveness of smartphone searches. Combining indicators that Canadian and 
Dutch courts—and the Dutch legislators—have developed, we can identify 
various relevant factors. We have clustered them in three groups of major 
factors, each encompassing various indicators or sub-factors.  
1. Scope and precision (how focused and targeted is the search 
itself?). 
a. Relationship to the offense for which the suspect was 
arrested. 
b. Specificity of the search action. 
c. Use of automated tools.  
2. Nature and amount of information to be examined (accessed).  
a. Nature of the offense. 
b. Nature of the storage device. 
3. Mode of storage of the data.  
a. Location of the data (local versus cloud; within a shared 
or private folder or app).  
b. Suitability of the data for automated searches.  
c. Presence of security measures.  
The first factor, the scope and precision of the search, is perhaps the most 
important one. It encompasses two of the four Fearon criteria: the search is truly 
incidental to the arrest, and the nature and the extent of the search are tailored to 
the purpose of the search.361 Thus, the search itself must bear a close relationship 
to the offense for which the suspect was arrested and should be precisely targeted 
to obtain only relevant information or files. The more narrowly the search is 
focused on finding evidence of the specific offense for which the suspect was 
arrested, the less intrusive it is likely to be. Typically, this will involve quick 
manual searches for a specific information object. Automated searches are a 
double-edged sword: they can be more intrusive, because more data will be 
investigated, and possibly come into view, than an officer could manually look 
at;362 but they can also be less intrusive, because they can help locate the sought 
information without the officer observing any non-relevant information in 
passing. If used properly, automated tools can assist in making a search more 
targeted, and hence less intrusive.363 
Scope and precision imply that the investigating officers should know 
(more or less) exactly what they are looking for, so that they can use offense-
related search terms that are as specific as possible, or look only in an app or 
directory that contains the type of information sought. This also implies, as the 
Fearon court has said, that in warrantless arrest-related searches, as a rule, “only 
recently sent or drafted emails, texts, photos and the call log may be examined 
 
 361. R v. Fearon, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 621, 661 (Can.); see also Bill Establishing Book 2, supra note 272, at 22, 
24 (Dutch Draft bill) (automated searching for images resembling a suspect’s graffiti tag is highly targeted and 
therefore low-intrusive; manually scrolling through a smartphone’s pictures of the past year to look for graffiti 
pictures is less targeted and therefore more intrusive). 
 362. HR 4 april 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:592, para. 3.4–3.5 (Neth.). 
 363. See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text. 
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as in most cases only those sorts of items will have the necessary link to the 
purposes for which prompt examination of the device is permitted.”364 If officers 
know what they are looking for, but have little clue where the information may 
be stored or cannot find it easily with highly specific search terms, then the 
search is likely to become less targeted, which is an important indicator that they 
should seek authorization from higher up before proceeding. 
From the perspective of our interest in new privacy frames emerging in the 
regulation of digital investigations, it is relevant to note that scope and 
precision—as a requirement for a search to be offense-related and as specific as 
possible—is a manifestation of contextual integrity. Contextual integrity is 
respect for informational norms,365 that is, norms “that govern activities and 
practices within and across contexts” and are “specifically concerned with the 
flow of personal information . . . from one party to another, or others.”366 As 
long as police carefully target their search for crime-related information, in the 
context of a search incident to arrest, they are less likely to violate contextual 
integrity than if they search more broadly: the flow of crime-related information 
to police can be expected, even if often unintended and undesired, by an arrestee, 
while police officers looking at non-crime-related information should not be 
expected. The framework of contextual integrity can thus support the approach 
of content protection in privacy assessments. 
Equally important is the second factor, the nature and amount of 
information to be examined. The amount of information accessed obviously 
matters—looking at one photograph is less intrusive than leafing through an 
entire photo gallery, for example. More importantly, combinations of data or 
information can create a larger, more complete picture—a mosaic—than loose 
data can.367 The nature of the data may be even more significant. Consulting 
photos may be more privacy-intrusive than consulting text files, since 
investigating officers can often leave aside text files as irrelevant without 
(entirely) taking note of their contents, but they will have seen the photos they 
discard as non-relevant. The subject matter also matters: some content (for 
example, nudity) is more privacy-sensitive than other content (for example, 
shopping lists);368 and some content, such as business-related information, is 
considered less privacy-relevant.369 The sensitivity of certain types of 
information is, however, context-dependent: pictures revealing homosexual 
orientation will, for instance, be highly sensitive for a closeted religious boy, but 
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far less so for an openly gay teacher. And information generally considered non-
sensitive, such as one’s music preferences, may in some cases be highly 
sensitive.370 Thus, data classified as “sensitive” under data protection law 
(relating, inter alia, to health, race, sexual life, and religion) are an important 
indicator of privacy-intrusiveness, but not a decisive factor.371 
A considerable challenge in applying this factor is that often, police will 
not know very clearly how much and which information they are going to 
investigate and retrieve; that will depend on many factors, including how the 
sought information (if present) is stored relative to other data. Some factors can, 
however, help in estimating the likelihood of the nature and amount of 
information being found during a search. One is the nature of the offense: the 
likelihood of finding pictures showing nudity is larger if someone is arrested for 
sextortion than for embezzlement.372 Another is the nature of the storage device. 
While this is the overarching criterion in the container approach (the nature of 
smartphones making them protection-worthy as such), it is a supportive criterion 
in the content approach: the storage capacity and, particularly, the mono-, multi, 
or hyper-functionality of the device give some indication of what (type of) 
information can be expected to be stored on (or accessible through) the device. 
The larger the storage space and the more functions enabled on the phone, the 
more likely many, diverse, or sensitive data can be found there and, hence, the 
more intrusive the search will potentially be, especially if it is not targeted and 
limited in scope, and vice versa.373  
The third factor is also relevant, but somewhat equivocal and perhaps less 
weighty than the first two. The mode of storage is mentioned by the Dutch 
legislators as a relevant factor,374 although with little explanation. We think this 
factor is a useful umbrella factor for several aspects of the way the data are 
stored. An interesting aspect is the location of the data. The location may be an 
indicator of the nature of the data (one expects the Photo Gallery to contain 
photos, and the internet history to contain information about visited websites). 
But in relation to the storage mode, location is particularly relevant in terms of 
whether data are stored on-device or externally, in the cloud. A smartphone 
search incident to arrest may involve not only data physically stored on the 
phone, but also data accessible to the phone; although not very explicitly, the 
Fearon decision seems to also encompass data accessible to the phone rather 
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than just data physically stored on it.375 This was also an important argument in 
Riley: since the police can search cloud-stored data from the seized phone, they 
reach far beyond “the physical proximity of an arrestee.”376 The Dutch 
smartphone judgment also suggests that smartphone searches might encompass 
cloud-stored data.377 Investigating such externally stored data is technically 
possible and possibly relevant, but makes the smartphone search rather different 
in character from traditional searches incident to arrest, which only involve 
objects in close vicinity to the arrestee. This, we think, is therefore an indicator 
of heightened intrusiveness.  
Another aspect of storage mode is the suitability of the data for automated 
searches, which the Dutch legislators list as a relevant factor.378 Smartphones by 
definition contain digital or digitized data, which makes them generally suitable 
for automatic searches; however, text can also be stored in non-searchable 
formats, such as non-searchable PDF documents or photos of texts. The presence 
of such non-searchable data formats lowers the intrusiveness of a search, since 
they require more effort to make them readable. The same applies to encrypted 
files, which are, of course, also non-searchable. This connects to a third aspect 
of storage mode: the presence of security measures. The lower and appeals 
courts in Fearon had considered the absence of security measures—"[t]he cell 
phone . . . was not ‘locked’ and had no password protection or other security 
walls”—a relevant factor, indicating a lower (or at least not a higher) reasonable 
expectation of privacy.379 In contrast, the SCC considered this immaterial: 
someone’s “decision not to password protect his or her cell phone does not 
indicate any sort of abandonment of the significant privacy interests one 
generally will have in the contents of the phone.”380 
c.  Logging and Other Procedural Mechanisms 
The notetaking (or logging) requirement announced by the Canadian 
Supreme Court in Fearon, requiring investigating officers to take detailed notes 
about how and what they examine during a search of a device381 constitutes a 
significant procedural control mechanism. This requirement, and others like it, 
could provide a strong safeguard against overly broad, dragnet searches of 
arrestees’ digital devices. This requirement is conspicuously absent in the Dutch 
system (and is somewhat irrelevant to the U.S. context, where these searches are 
banned outright), causing some of the problems we noted in Part I.C.4, above. 
We suggest that something like this logging requirement could serve as a crucial 
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regulatory mechanism for controlling and limiting the scope of police 
smartphone searches in jurisdictions favoring content-based approaches. 
Other rules that would control what types of data the police can search, or 
the range of law enforcement agents who might have access to the data, prior to 
additional authorization, could also serve a similar limiting purpose. For 
example, in the rules that regulate police hacking powers (that is, the ability to 
access digital systems remotely and covertly), each of these three countries 
discussed in this paper have, to a varying extent, limited police powers to search 
devices (remotely) based on the functionality of the search (for example, based 
on the officers’ goals, the type of data likely to be discovered, and the nature of 
a particular investigatory method).382 This is related to the Canadian requirement 
that the nature and extent of smartphone searches must be tailored to the purpose 
of the search, although the Canadian requirement is more vague and context-
dependent than, for example, the Dutch rules that segment hacking powers by 
specific functionalities, which distinguish, for example, between looking for 
identifying information, communications, and searching through all data.383  
Moreover, in the Dutch hacking legislation, the legislators have 
promulgated rules that separate the technical from the tactical officers involved 
in the investigation as a privacy-protective measure.384 In one smartphone 
investigation case, this was also stipulated as a condition for the search.385 The 
reasoning behind this is that limiting the circle of people who look at smartphone 
data can be privacy-enhancing, especially in the context of “thorough ‘data-
dump’ searches”386 that involve copying all data on the device and then 
analyzing them with technical tools. Because officers investigating a case have 
an interest in finding evidence, there is some risk they overstep the boundary of 
what they can look at. Thus, function separation is a good way to prevent dragnet 
searches and decrease the privacy-related harm when non-relevant data may be 
seen, because technical officers (rather than the primary investigating officers) 
who analyze the data would normally not know the suspects or engage with 
them.  
The Dutch view might seem a narrow perspective on privacy intrusiveness. 
However, Dutch courts generally argue that the privacy harm that accrues during 
a smartphone search is based on the consequences of a police officer’s taking 
knowledge of personal information about the individual: as long as an officer’s 
“taking knowledge of the suspect’s private data” has not led “to any further 
dissemination of private data or any other concrete prejudice” beyond the 
confines of the relevant investigation, Dutch courts have found the privacy 
violation to be only minimally invasive.387 Possibly, the line of reasoning in 
Dutch case law may be shifting in the future: recently, Advocate-General 
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Spronken has advised the Supreme Court to rule that courts should investigate 
by themselves the actual harm that a smartphone search caused to a suspect, 
because the burden of proving the exact harm cannot be put on the defense.388 If 
the Dutch Supreme Court follows this advice, law enforcement officers might 
be stimulated to document their search activities better in order to convince 
courts that they did not overstep thresholds of intrusiveness.  
Another interesting strategy in this context might be Orin Kerr’s proposal 
(within the Fourth Amendment context) to narrow, or even abolish, the plain 
view doctrine for computer searches, for example, to disallow use of information 
about another crime that came “into plain view” when searching for information 
related to the case at hand.389 This might, according to Kerr, be a plausible way 
to prevent dragnet investigations in the future.390 
CONCLUSION 
Tensions between law enforcement interests in conducting criminal 
investigations and individual privacy are brought to the fore by the regulatory 
choice to either institute a blanket ban on investigatory conduct (like that 
imposed by Riley) or a more nuanced, case-by-case, and context-dependent 
inquiry (like those promulgated in Canada and the Netherlands). Both 
approaches, and recent supreme court attention in all three countries, were 
motivated by similar concerns about the informational privacy risks attendant in 
allowing warrantless searches of digital communication devices with massive 
storage capacity. However, the outcomes reached in each country differ in 
important ways, especially in terms of how law enforcement officers must 
modify their daily practice to comply. In comparison to the container-based 
approach in the United States (restricting almost all searches of cellphones 
without a warrant), we find that the content-based approaches in Dutch and 
Canadian law are more granular and would allow more focused, fine-tuned 
searches for crime-related evidence as long as the search is not too 
comprehensive, open-ended, or fully automated.  
Both approaches have drawbacks. On one hand, the container approach is 
limited, despite its practical benefits in terms of drawing bright lines that officers 
on the ground can follow more easily. It works only in combination with many 
other doctrines in criminal law (some of which, like the particularity and warrant 
requirements in U.S. law, cannot be easily exported to other jurisdictions). 
Because not all searches of smartphones are flights to the moon, sole reliance on 
the container approach to protecting privacy in the search-incident-to-arrest 
context is likely to overprotect privacy at the expense of police investigations. 
Indeed, the container approach is inherently limited because its blanketing ban 
on smartphone searches incident to arrest does not always correspond to the 
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specific concerns that motivated the U.S. Supreme Court to adopt it (that is, the 
outcome of the ruling does not reflect all the nuance visible in the Court’s 
reasoning to come to its conclusion).  
On the other hand, the content approach is also limited. Focusing only on 
content, and determining the legality of each smartphone search by the level of 
intrusiveness (or “(profound) systematicness”) evident in each case, erases many 
of the bright lines visible to police officers on the ground, making it much more 
difficult for them to know, in advance, what they are allowed to do. The 
unpredictability of the legality of their searches may be reflected in the lack of 
information provided to judges in Dutch cases on how searches were conducted. 
As a result, these cases tend to focus on the investigation’s outcomes (for 
example, one incriminating photograph found) rather than its process (for 
example, looking through all photographs). This concern might be ameliorated 
by something like the note-taking requirement established by Fearon. More 
generally, the content approach is more likely to work if the three mitigation 
strategies described above391 are followed in order to make the approach easier 
to operationalize in practice. Thus, while the content approach does have limits, 
these limitations could substantially be addressed in practice by applying 
mitigation strategies that not only limit broad dragnet searches but also provide 
some practical guidance to police officers on the ground. 
In the end, we conclude that combining both approaches may achieve the 
best results. We suggest that blending elements from the content- and container-
based approaches might provide a fruitful alternative path forward, as they could 
function as complementary normative frameworks.392 Indeed, a combination of 
emerging and preexisting container-based and content-based approaches to 
regulating police searches might be used to solve the challenge of finding a 
framework that is both sufficiently concrete (to be manageable for police 
officers) and sufficiently technology-neutral (to be sustainable in light of 
significant and ongoing socio-technical change). Thus, balancing the benefits of 
both approaches, while attending to the drawbacks and mitigation strategies 
noted above, may provide a better way forward, providing practical, usable 
guidance for police officers on the ground while at the same time recognizing 
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